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WATER RIGHTS LAW 
PETERSON v. DEPARTMENT OF THE 
INTERIOR: ARE CONTRACT RIGHTS EVER 
PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER THE 
RECLAMATION REFORM ACT? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Peterson u. Department of the Interior l the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that section 203(b)2 of the Reclamation Reform Act of 
1982 (RRA),3 a comprehensive amendment of the Federal Recla-
mation Act,· did not unconstitutionally take the property of 
state Water Districts in California's Central Valley without due 
process or compensation.~ The court found that pre-existing 
1. Peterson v. Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1990) (per Norris, 
J.; the other panel members were Noonan, J. and Leavy, J.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 567 
(1990). 
2. 43 U.S.C. §§ 390cc(a)-(b) (1989). 
3. Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1263-75 (codified 
as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa-390zz-1 (1989». The RRA made substantial changes 
in the Federal Reclamation Act of 1902 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-616 
(1989». The RRA was intended to curtail longstanding abuses in the administration of 
the 1902 Act. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 804-06. 
Section 203(b) of the RRA, 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(b), (the "Hammer Clause") provided 
that, upon passage of the Act, state water districts must either amend pre-1982 water 
delivery contracts with district landowners, so that federally subsidized water would be 
delivered only to owners or leaseholders of tracts of less than 960 acres; or charge excess 
landowners full cost for previously subsidized water .. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 806-07. 
4. Federal Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 
43 U.S.C. §§ 371-616 (1989». The Reclamation Act provides for a federal system of 
water development and delivery in 17 Western states. Sax, Federal Reclamation Law, 2 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 110.2 at 121 (R. Clark ed. 1967 & Supp. 1978). 
5. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 813. The Ninth Circuit held that neither Congressional fail-
ure expressly to reserve the right to amend the terms of water delivery contracts in its 
original legislative scheme, nor ambiguous language in the plaintiff Water Districts' con-
tracts with the Bureau of Reclamation, amounted to a waiver of the federal government's 
sovereign right to change its laws so as to affect contracts previously made under those 
175 
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water delivery contracts with the Bureau of Reclamation did not 
confer a constitutionally protectable right to receive federally 
subsidized water upon the Water Districts.s 
In Peterson, the first ruling by any circuit court? on a direct 
challenge to the RRA, the Ninth Circuit examined the retroac-
tive effect of a federal statute on a pre-existing federal water 
delivery contract.8 
The issues of vested rights in reclamation water, due pro-
cess and taking raised by the plaintiffs in Peterson had been 
considered in many pre-1982 cases9 involving the Reclamation 
laws. [d. at 812. 
6. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 811, 813. Since mere contract rights rather than property 
rights were affected, there could be no taking. [d. at 813. Nor was there an issue of due 
process, because the challenged "Hammer Clause" (43 U.S.C. §§ 390cc(a)-(b», which 
changed the terms under which water could be delivered, was rationally related to a 
legitimate congressional purpose, and thus was not arbitrary or irrational. Peterson, 899 
F.2d at 813. 
7. Two previous federal cases involved the Act, but did not challenge its new provi-
sions. See Etsi Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495 (1988) (Secretary of Interior 
lacked authority to contract for withdrawal of water from Army reservoir, since RRA 
provision that lands benefiting from Army Corps projects are exempt from ownership 
limitations unless expressly provided otherwise did not change substantive provisions of 
Flood Control Act for manner in which water may be withdrawn from Lake Oahe for 
irrigation); Bostwick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 900 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(under RRA, Department of Interior could charge irrigation districts in Kansas for ex-
penses incurred by Army Corps of Engineers for operation and maintenance of dam sup-
plying districts' water). 
8. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 801. See also Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water 
Dist., 899 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Boston Ranch Co. v. Depart-
ment of the Interior, 111 S. Ct. 555 (1990) (amendment to RRA that altered terms of 
water delivery contracts did not take property of individual landowners without due pro-
cess); Flint v. United States, 906 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1990) (Secretary of the Interior had 
statutory authority to set prices for reclamation project groundwater). The court in Flint 
followed Peterson in finding a8 a matter of law that plaintiffs had no property right in 
groundwater and that therefore there was no fifth amendment violation when the prices 
were changed. Flint, 906 F.2d at 476-77. 
9. E.g., Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980) (Imperial Valley landowners who, by 
virtue of membership in pre-1928 private irrigation plans, possessed perfected state law 
water rights in Colorado River irrigation water exempt from Reclamation Act ownership 
provisions); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) (under section 8 of Reclama-
tion Act Bureau of Reclamation may not interfere with vested state law water rights, and 
state of California may impose state-law restrictions on Bureau's water appropriation 
permit); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958) (Reclamation Act's 
excess lands provisions did not effect unconstitutional taking of vested property rights 
without due process, because provisions were reasonable conditions imposed on federal 
grant under taxing and spending powers); Israel v. Morton, 549 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(rights to receive reclamation water and to sell land for ex-project prices were not vested 
beyond the government's power to take without compensation, as there is no vested right 
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Act's excess lands provisions. Io In Peterson the Ninth Circuit re-
lied on past Reclamation Act case lawll to illustrate Reclamation 
Act history and legislative purpose.I2 To determine whether con-
tract rights to receive water equalled property rights, however, 
the court made use of a retroactivity analysis not adopted in 
previous reclamation-law cases. IS The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the Water District's contract rights were not vested prop-
erty rights so that a taking analysis was not necessary.I4 The 
court also found that there was a rational relationship between 
the provisions of the Reclamation Reform Act and the legislative 
purpose underlying federal reclamation law, so there was no ba-
sis for due process protection of contract rights. I6 
II. FACTS 
The plaintiffs in Peterson were ten California Water Dis-
tricts,!6 that held forty-year contracts,!' some originating thirty 
to continuation of status conferred by government contract). 
10. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1989) (delivery of subsidized water limited to resident owners of 
lands of less than 160 acres); 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1989) (to receive subsidized water for 
excess lands, owners must execute recordable contracts with Department of the Interior, 
promising to divest excess lands within 10 years, subject to Department approval). 
11. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 802-03. The cases included California v. United States, 438 
U.S. 645 (1978); City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. 
v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); United States v. Tulare Lake Canal. Co., 535 F.2d 
1093 (9th Cir. 1976); National Land for People, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 417 F. 
Supp. 449 (D.D.C. 1976). 
12. Peterson, 899 F.2d 799. This was also true in a related case decided two days 
after Peterson. Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d 814 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
13. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 807-12. In this analysis the court examined the govern-
ment's right to amend legislation affecting its own pre-existing contracts, whether the 
government's sovereign right to amend must be express rather than implied, and the 
extent to which rights under government contracts equalled constitutionally protected 
property rights. [d. See also Barcellos & Wolfsen Inc. v. Department of the Interior, 899 
F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1990). In Barcellos & Wolfsen, by contrast with Peterson, the Ninth 
Circuit postulated that contract rights could equal property rights. [d. at 821. The issue 
of retroactivity with respect to irrigation contracts under the the Reclamation Act was 
previously considered in Israel v. Morton, 549 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1977). 
14. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 813. 
15. [d. at 814. 
16. Peterson, 899 F.2d 799. Peterson consolidated four cases, all brought in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiff Water 
Districts were Dunnigan Water District, Westside Water District, Kanawha Water Dis-
trict, Arvin-Edison Water Storage District, Southern San Joaquin Municipal Utility Dis-
trict, Panoche Water District, San Luis Water District, Lower Tule River Irrigation Dis-
trict, Delano-Earlimart Irrigation District and Tulare Irrigation District. Plaintiffs also 
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years ago18 to purchase irrigation water from the Department of 
the Interior .19 These contracts typically guaranteed water to 
each district at a fixed price for the contract period.20 Each 
Water District distributed water to landowners21 in the district 
after determining, as the Water Districts' federal contract re-
quired,22 that the land to which water was delivered met the 
statutory eligibility requirement that water not be delivered to 
any farm of more than 160 acres.23 
included the Central Valley Project Water Association, the Sacramento River Water 
Contractors Association, and Peter D. Peterson, Catherine Stevens Zahn, and Laverne 
Stevens Siebert who were individual landowners who received reclamation water. [d. at 
801 n.l. Since the landowners' claim to any rights in reclamation water was dependent 
on the Water Districts' contractual right to the water, the court referred to plaintiffs 
collectively as "Water Districts." [d. 
Defendants in each case were the United States Department of the Interior; Donald 
Hodel, Secretary of the Department of the Interior; and C. Dale Duvall, Commissioner of 
the Federal Bureau of Reclamation. The Natural Resources Defense Council, a p~blic 
interest law firm, was a defendant/intervenor. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 799. 
17. [d. at 801. For any water delivery to take place, the Bureau of Reclamation is 
required by statute to have executed contracts with Water Districts. 43 U.S.C. § 423e 
(1989). The statute provides: 
Id. 
No water shall be delivered upon the completion of any new 
project ... until a contract or contracts in form approved by 
the Secretary of the Interior shall have been made with an ir-
rigation district or irrigation districts organized under State 
law .... 
18. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 801 n.2. 
19. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 801. Most of the contracts at issue in Peterson run for 40-
year terms. [d. While many of the contracts are due to expire in the 1990s, one, at least, 
will not expire until 2026. Id. at 801 n.2. The statutory maximum for contracts is 40 
years. 43 U.S.C. §§ 485h(d)(3)-(e). 
20. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 801. Contract prices ranged from $2.00 to $7.00 per acre-
foot; actual cost of delivered water was $8.43 to $55.61 per acre foot. Peterson, 899 F.2d 
at 805 (citing 125 CONGo REc. 24,342 (1982) (statement of Sen. Nelson». The exact 
amounts differed with each District. The Ninth Circuit noted, "[allthough each District 
was charged a different rate for the water it received, all of the contract rates represent a 
significant government subsidy." Peterson, 899 F.2d at 801. 
21. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 801. Water delivery contracts between landowners and 
Water Districts are controlled by state law, rather than by federal reclamation law. Roos-
Collins, Voluntary Conveyance of the Right to Receive a Water Supply from the Bu-
reau of Reclamation, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 773 , 825,848 (1987). Compare Barcellos & Wolf-
sen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 825 n.18 (9th Cir. 1990) (law applied to 
United States contracts is federal law). 
22. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 801. 
23. Id. The court in Peterson noted that the only express eligibility requirement in 
the contracts was the 160-acre ownership limitation, regardless of whether the owner was 
& natural person or a corporation. [d. The contracts did not expressly prohibit the Water 
Districts from delivering water to leased acreages of more than 160 acres. [d. See 43 
U.S.C. § 431 (1989). 
Under the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, landowners who owned more than 160 
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In 1982 the Reclamation Reform Act (RRA)24 was enacted 
by Congress.2G The eligibility requirements for receiving feder-
ally subsidized water were changed so that a single landholder 
could own or lease up to 960 acres;26 but no subsidized water 
could be delivered to tracts held in excess of 960 acres.27 The 
provision28 was designed to close a "leasing 100phole"29 that for 
many years had permitted large agricultural companies to cir-
cumvent the law limiting delivery of subsidized water to tracts 
of 160 acres per person.30 Congress permitted each water district 
to choose its means of conforming with the new law.31 
acres and who wished to receive subsidized water for their excess lands had only to sign 
"recordable contracts" directly with the Bureau of Reclamation, stating that they would 
sell their lands in excess of 160 acres within 10 years of signing, and that the sale would 
be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1989). See 
also Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Before 1982, the statute was silent on whether federal water could be delivered to 
leased land, and the residency requirement was not enforced. Candee, The Broken 
Promise of Reclamation Reform, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 661 (1989). 
24. 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa-390zz-1 (1989). 
25. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 806. 
26. 43 U.S.C. § 390dd(1). 
27. 43 U.S.C. § 390dd. Water for land in excess of 960 acres could be supplied at full 
cost. 43 U.S.C. § 390ee. See also Peterson, 899 F.2d at 806. Large business entities, bene-
fiting more than 25 persons, could only receive subsidized water for land owned or leased 
up to 320 acres. 43 U.S.C. § 390ee(a)(2)-(3); Peterson, 899 F.2d at 801 n.3. 
28. 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(a)-(b). 
29. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 806. 
30.Id. 
31. Id. at 801. The pertinent parts of 43 U.S.C. § 390cc (b) read: 
New or amended contracts. 
(a) Generally. The provisions of this subchapter shall be 
applicable to any district ... (3) which amends its contract for 
the purpose of conforming to the provisions of this 
subchapter. 
(b) Amendment of existing contracts. Any district which 
has an existing contract with the secretary as of October 12, 
1982, which does not enter into an amendment of such con-
tract as specified in subsection (a) of this section shall be sub-
ject to federal reclamation law in effect immediately prior to 
October 12, 1982, as that law is amended or supplemented by 
. sections 209 through 230 of this title. Within a district that 
does not enter into an amendment of its contract with the sec-
retary within four and one-half years of October 12, 1982, irri-
gation water may be delivered to lands leased in excess of a 
landholding of one hundred and sixty acres only if full cost, as 
defined in section 390bb(3)(A) of this title, is paid for such 
water as is assignable to those lands leased in excess of such 
landholding of one hundred and sixty acres: Provided, That 
the interest rate used in computing full cost under this subsec-
tion shall be the same as provided in section 390ee(a)(3) of 
this title. 
5
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The Water Districts, in four lawsuits that were consolidated 
by the Ninth Circuit, sued the Department of the Interior.32 
They claimed that their pre-existing contracts with the govern-
ment gave them a vested property right in receiving the water 
promised under the contracts at the previous subsidized prices.38 
They requested a declaration that the RRA's section 203(b) (the 
"Hammer Clause") was unconstitutional, asserting due process 
and taking violations of the fifth amendment. 34 The district 
[d. Sections 209 through 230 of the Reclamation Reform Act are codified at 43 u.s.c. §§ 
390ii-390zz-1; 373a; 422e; 425b; 485h. 
"Full cost" is defined in the statute as 1) an annual rate calculated to amortize capi-
tal expenditures for property and construction of projects; 2) all costs of operation and 
maintenance (O&M) over the period of the contract; and 3) interest on both capital costs 
and O&M costs, beginning in October 1982. 43 U.S.C. § 390bb(3)(A). 43 U.S.C. § 
390ee(a)(3) provides for full cost delivery of water to landholdings in excess of 960 acres 
for "qualified recipients," individuals, legal entities that benefit fewer than 25 persons 
(43 U.S.C. § 390bb(9)); in excess of 320 acres for "limited recipients," legal entities that 
benefit more than 25 persons (43 U.S.C. § 390bb(7)), provided the landholder had been 
receiving water before October 1981; or to all land held by a limited recipient that had 
not received any irrigation water before October 1981. 
32. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 800-01. 
33. [d. at 807. The contract used by the court as an example, the Lower Tule River 
Irrigation District water service contract, included the following provisions: 
Duration: 40 years (Article 2). 
Price ceiling: For the duration of the contract, water prices 
were limited to $3.50 per acre foot for Class 1 water and $1.50 
per acre foot for Class 2 water (Article 5(a)). 
Right to water: Under the contract and its renewals, not to be 
disturbed as long as the District fulfilled all its obligations 
under the contracts (Article 7(f)). 
Delivery of water to excess lands: The water could be deliv-
ered to lands in excess of 160 acres held in the beneficial own-
ership of any private individual, whether a natural person or a 
corporation, "so long as a recordable contract to divest the 
lands had been executed with the Department of the Interior" 
(Articles 18(a) and 20(a)). 
Provisions for congressional amendments to the Reclamation 
Act: 1. In the event of repeal of the "so-called excess land pro-
visions," the provisions relating to excess lands will no longer 
have any force or effect. 2. In the event of congressional 
amendment of the excess lands provisions, or other provisions 
of the federal reclamation laws, the United States agrees, at 
the option of the District, to negotiate amendment of appro-
priate articles of this contract, all consistently with the provi-
sion of such repeal or amendment (Article 21). 
Peterson, 899 F.2d at 809 (citing to Excerpt of Record ("E.R.") Vol. IX, Tab 2, Exh. E) 
(emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit's opinion did not cite any provision for contract 
amendment at the option of the federal government. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 809. 
34. [d. at 801-02. 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss1/12
1991] WATER RIGHTS LAW 181 
court rendered summary judgment in favor of the government 
on the fifth amendment claims.311 The Water Districts 
appealed. 3~ 
On appeal, the Water Districts contended that, because 
Congress had not expressly reserved the right to amend the 
Act's eligibility requirements in the original Reclamation Act, 
Congressional right to amend the water service contracts was 
limited.37 The Districts also argued that, where there was no ex-
press reservation of the right to amend the contracts in the con-
trolling legislation, the court could look only to the language of 
the contracts for guidance in interpretation.38 The Districts 
claimed that the language of the contracts gave them an implied 
right to deliver subsidized water to leased tracts of any size,39 
and that the contracts included an express waiver by Congress 
of its right to amend the contracts without the consent of the 
Water Districts.·o 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. RECLAMATION ACT PURPOSE AND HISTORY 
Congress passed the Federal Reclamation Act·1 in 1902 to 
promote the settlement of arid Western public lands by small 
farmers,, 2 The Act was designed to help settle the West,43 to 
35. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 802. The Water Districts' other claims, based on 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (1989) (provides a federal cause of action for a person deprived of federal consti-
tutional or statutory rights by a person acting under color of state law), the ex post facto 
clause of the Constitution, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel were dismissed by the trial court and were not ap-
pealed. [d. at 802 n.5. 
36. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 802. 
37. [d. at 807. 
38. [d. 
39. [d. at 807-08. The Water Districts contended that because under Article 18(a) of 
the contracts the only express limitation was upon the ability of the Water Districts to 
deliver water to "forty acres of a 200 acre family-owned farm," they therefore had an 
implied right to deliver unlimited amounts of subsidized water to leased acreages. [d. at 
809-10. 
40. [d. at 808. 
41. Federal Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 
43 U.S.C. §§ 371-616 (1989». 
42. United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509, 521 (9th Cir. 1977). See 
also Sax, supra note 4 § 110.1; Taylor, Excess Land Law: Calculated Circumvention, 52 
CALIF. L. REV. 978 (1964). 
The Federal Reclamation Act evolved from previous Congressional actions designed 
7
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prevent monopoly of Western lands by large companies such as 
railroad companies" and to increase agricultural production.'11 
The Act provided federal funds to construct dams, reservoirs 
and waterways to collect Western water and deliver it to the arid 
lands in the Southwest.'6 The funds were to come from the sale 
of public lands," and were to be replenished by repayment of 
construction costs by participating irrigators.'8 
In the mid-nineteen-thirties, the State of California devel-
oped the Central Valley Project (CVP) in cooperation with the 
United States government.'9 In the CVP, California irrigation 
to promote settlement of the West. In 1862, Congress passed the Homestead Act. Cali-
fornia v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 656 (1978); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock 
Co., 339 U.S. 725, 748 (1950). The Homestead Act (which was repealed in 1976) provided 
that a person who occupied, irrigated and cultivated a 160-acre tract for five years would 
gain title to the land from the government. 
Homesteading proved not to be possible on arid western lands because of lack of 
water, so Congress passed the Desert Land Act of 1877. Landowners could not irrigate by 
themselves, since it required enormous systems of darns, canals and aquaducts to collect 
water from rivers and deliver it to lands hundreds of miles away. California v. United 
States, 438 U.S. 645, 657 (1978); Sax, supra note 4, § 110.1 at 114. The Desert Land Act 
was abused by speculators who paid witnesses to testify that they had qualified for own-
ership because they had "seen water upon the land" (for example, a bucket had been 
emptied on the ground in their presence), and who then conveyed the land to large com-
panies. Id. at 115. The Act's purpose clearly could not be achieved without a govern-
ment-funded irrigation system. Gerlach, 339 U.S. 725, 728-29; Sax, supra note 4, § 110.1 
at 115. The Court in Gerlach noted, "[The Central Valley's] rich acres, counted in the 
millions, are deficient in rainfall and must remain generally arid and unfruitful unless 
artificially watered." Id. at 728. See also California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 649; 
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 280 (1958); S. REP. No. 373, 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2570, 2572. 
43. California u. United States, 438 U.S. at 655-63. 
44. Sax, supra note 4, § 110.1 at 115; Taylor, Circumuention, supra note 41 at 979. 
See also California· u. United States, 438 U.S. at 657. 
45. Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. V. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir. 
1990). . 
46. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, §§ 2-4, Stat. 388. Central Valley reclamation 
projects now develop and sell water for multiple uses, including power, municipal, com-
mercial and industrial uses. S. REP. No. 373, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1982 
U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2570, 2572; Sax, supra note 4, § 110.2 at 121. See also 
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. V. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958). Some uses are never 
expected to be remunerative to the government. Id. 
47. Sax, supra note 4, § 111.1 at 129 (citing the Federal Reclamation Act of 1902 
and later amendments that added Texas (1906), Alaska (1950) and Hawaii (1955». 
48. Sax, supra note 4 § 111.1 at 129 (quoting Swigard V. Baker, 229 U.S. 187, 194 
(1913». It was soon recognized, however, that in fact payments for water would not be 
nearly enough to replenish the construction costs. City of Fresno V. California, 372 U.S. 
627, 631 (1963). 
49. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 279 (1958); California V. 
United States, 438 U.S. 645, 650 (1958). But cf. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 
8
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and water districts, organized under state law,lio contractedli1 to 
buy water at a set price per acre-footli2 from the Bureau of Rec-
lamation, and then resold it to private landowners.1i3 The con-
tract price represented a significant subsidy to the farmers. Ii. 
Under the Reclamation Act, the CVP could supply water to 
plots of land that were 160 acres or less and on which the land-
owner lived.1i1i The Bureau of Reclamation routinely permitted 
delivery of federal water to owners of plots larger than 160 acres, 
however.1i6 This was tacitly legalized by the Omnibus Adjust-
339 U.S. 725, 728 (1950) (Central Valley project was taken over by the United States in 
1935 and has since been a federal enterprise). By further contrast, the California Su-
preme Court in Ivanhoe v. All Parties and All Persons, 47 Cal. 2d 597, 631, 306 P.2d 824, 
836 (1957) characterized the relationship as that of debtor and creditor, and of purveyor-
buyer. Cf. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Indian Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 145 (1982) (a sovereign 
can occupy both a commercial and sovereign relationship with its contractors); Sinking 
Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 724 (1878) ("The United States occupy toward this corporation 
a two-fold relation - that of sovereign and that of creditor.") 
50. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 11102; 20500-26875; 34150-37214 (West 1984 & Supp. 
1991). 
51. See 43 U.S.C. § 511 (1989) (under water delivery contracts, water rights applica-
tions on the part of landowners and entrymen may, in the discretion of the Secretary of 
the Interior, be dispensed with). See also CAL. WATER CODE §§ 23195-502' (cooperation 
with the United States). 
52. Roos-Collins, supra note 21, at 821. One acre-foot is 43,560 cubic feet, the vol-
ume of water that will cover an area of one acre to a depth of one foot. THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (W. Morris ed. 1981). As the nation's 
largest water utility, the Bureau of Reclamation delivers a total of 30 million acre-feet a 
year, of which 26.3 million are for agricultural use. Roos-Collins, supra note 21, at 776-
77. One acre-foot of water can supply the water needs of approximately 10,000 three-
person California households for one year (figures supplied by East Bay Municipal Util-
ity District). 
53. 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1989). See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 
899 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 1990). Subscribers in the Water Districts are beneficiaries of 
the Districts' federal contracts even though they are not parties to the contracts. [d. See 
also Peterson v. Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 801 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990). 
54. E.P. LeVeen & L. King, Turning off the Tap on Federal Water Subsidies; The 
Central Valley Project: The $3.5 Billion Giveaway at 2-3; 51-91 (Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. and California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation 1985). The subsidy 
includes four elements: forgiveness of interest, relaxation of the original timeline for re-
payment of capital costs, fixed rate contracts that do not reflect operating and manage-
ment costs, and free hydropower for pumping water. [d. 
55. 43 U.S.C. § 431. A man and wife could receive water for 320 acres. [d. The re-
striction was intended to serve the same purposes as the restrictions of the Homestead 
Act and other public land laws. United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093, 
1094 (1976). These purposes were to provide land to citizens of modest means, to bring 
more lands into agricultural production, and to prevent land monopoly. [d. See also Sax, 
supra note 4, § 110.2 at 121. 
56. Candee, supra note 23, at 672; Sax, supra note 4, §120.12 at 232; Taylor, The 
Excess Land Law: Execution of a Public Policy, 64 YALE L.J. 477 (1955); Taylor, Cir-
9
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ment Act of 1926.117 Under this amendment to the Reclamation 
Act, state water districtsCi8 were permitted to deliver water to 
owners of lands in excess of 160 acres if the owner executed a 
recordable contract with the Department of the lnterior in 
which he promised to sell the excess lands in ten years. CiB 
The statute did not address, either to condone or forbid, 
whether leased land could receive subsidized water.60 Because 
the statute applied only to land that was "privately owned," a 
leasing loophole was created that was liberally taken advantage 
of by agricultural companies.6} The companies frequently leased 
l60-acre tracts from the owners and farmed the land to circum-
vent the l60-acre restriction and benefit from the subsidy.62 
The Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Reclama-
tion continued not to enforce the acreage requirement or the ex-
cess lands provision, in policy and in implementation.63 Admin-
cumvention, supra note 42 at 987-89; Taylor, National Reclamation in the Imperial 
Valley: Law v. Policy, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 125 (1983). In 1981, farms of 160 acres or less 
that were receiving federal irrigation water comprised less than 23% of the total water 
recipients. 128 CONGo REC. 16,599 (1982) (document submitted by Sen. Exon). Three per-
cent of the owners controlled 30% of the lands receiving federal water. 128 CONGo REC. 
16,421 (1982) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). 
57. Act of May 25, 1926, ch. 383, 44 Stat. 636 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 
423e (1989». After passage of the Omnibus Adjustment Act, the Department of the Inte-
rior ignored the residency requirement completely. The federal statute did not address, 
either to condone or to forbid, whether owners of the 160-acre tracts could lease them to 
other farmers; S. REP. No. 373, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 2570, 2573; Kelley, Acreage and Residency Limitations in the Imperial 
Valley: A Case Study in National Reclamation Policy, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 621, 622 
(1978). 
58. 43 U.S.C. § 423e. A Water District is a state agency under California law. CAL. 
WATER CODE § 11102 (West 1971). 
59. 43 U.S.C. § 423e. The clause noted in the text is the "excess lands provision." 
The land was to be sold subject to approval by the chief of the Bureau of Reclamation at 
ex-project prices. Id. See also Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d at 816; Israel v. Morton, 
. 549 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1977). Ex-project prices were calculated with a working assump-
tion that the land would not receive subsidized water. Id. at 131. See 43 U.S.C. § 390ii(e) 
(1989) (excess lands disposed of by Secretary of Interior are to be sold for fair market 
value unrelated to irrigation water deliveries). 
60. S. REP. No. 373, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2570, 2573. 
61. 128 CONGo REC. 16,596 (1982) (statement of Sen. Exon). See also Candee, supra 
note 23. 
62. Candee, supra note 23 at 661-62; E.P. LeVeen & L. King, supra note 54 at 12. 
63. Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. V. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 817 (1990); 
Taylor, Excess Land Law, supra note 56; Taylor, Circumvention, supra note 42 at 987-
89 (1964); Taylor, National Reclamation, supra note 56. Repayment periods have been 
10
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istrative policies and practices were often in conflict with the law 
and the rules.64 Administrative rules governing water delivery to 
excess lands were often reversed. 611 The practical effect was that, 
for most of the history of the Reclamation Act, the excess lands 
provisions were circumvented.66 
The excess lands legislation and its administrative abuse 
stimulated litigation both by parties that wanted the provisions 
invalidated67 and by parties that wanted to have them en-
forced. 66 In the 1970s the number and complexity of these cases 
increased.69 In 1976 the Department of the Interior was enjoined 
from approving excess land sales until the Department had 
promulgated rules detailing the criteria and procedures for ap-
proving sales.70 Water delivery contracts continued, in spite of 
extended for 50 years or more. Sax, supra note 4, § 110.3 at 122 . 
64. S. REP. No. 373, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2570, 2574; Taylor, Circumvention, supra note 42 at 990-1008; Taylor, Ex-
cess Land Law. supra note 56 at 490-95. 
65. United States V. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 740-42 (1950); Bryant V. 
Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 363 (1980); Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. V. Westlands Water Dist., 899 
F.2d 814, 816-19 (9th Cir. 1990); Washington V. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 
1969) (after passage of a law bringing school districts under general provisions of recla-
mation law, Bureau officials refused to deliver water to school-owned tracts in excess of 
160 acres). 
66. Taylor, Circumvention, supra note 42 at 990-1008. 
67. E.g., Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. V. All Parties and All Persons, 47 Cal. 2d 597, 306 
P.2d 824 (1957), rev'd, Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. V. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958). In an 
in rem action by water districts for approval of their repayment contracts with the Bu-
reau of Reclamation, the California Supreme Court declared the contracts invalid on the 
ground that section 8 of the Reclamation Act, which provides that the Act should not 
interfere with state water law, obtained, and the excess land provisions interfered with 
state law. [d. at 277-79. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 
8 applied only to situations in which the government must purchase water rights to build 
or operate the project. [d. at 291. See also United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 322 
F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd, 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1979), modified, 595 F.2d 525 
(9th Cir. 1979), rev 'd Bryant V. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980). 
68~ Yellen V. Hickel, 335 F. Supp. 200 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (in suit by non-land holders 
to enforce residency requirement, requirement upheld as a critical component of national 
policy), supplemented by Yellen v. Hickel, 352 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Cal. 1972), vacated, 
United States V. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977), modified, 595 
F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1979). 
69. E.g., Bryant V. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980) and underlying cases. In 1967 the 
160-acre limit on the size of tracts that could receive federal water was called the "most 
litigated" issue in reclamation law. Sax, supra note 4, § 120 at 209. 
70. National Land for People, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 417 F. Supp. 449 (D. 
D.C. 1976) (would-be small landholders granted standing to intervene in the Imperial 
Valley litigation; and injunction on further processing of land sales under recordable con-
tracts granted). In National Land For People, Central Valley dwellers were granted an 
injunction against the Bureau, requiring it to revise its regulations before approving any 
11
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judicial decisions to the contrary, to be administered in contra-
vention of both statute and decisional law.71 
In 1982, the Reclamation Reform Act (RRA)72 was passed. 
The purpose of the RRA was to resolve the many controversies 
that would result if the original law were to be implemented as 
written.73 The RRA closed the leasing 100phole,74 restricting de-
livery of subsidized water to owners or operators of tracts that 
did not exceed 960 acres.7tI The RRA. also decreased the amount 
of federal subsidy,78 effectively raising the price of all reclama-
tion water." 
The "Hammer Clause"7s required water districts that had 
further excess lands sales. Id. The injunction granted in National Land for People re-
sulted in the six-year delay in processing excess lands sales that figured in Barcellos & 
Wolfsen, Inc. v. Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1990». See also 
Bowker v. Morton, 541 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1976) (family farmers in Central Valley de-
nied standing to intervene in Imperial Valley cases). 
71. Candee, supra note 23 at 661-62 (citing Taylor, Circumvention, supra note 42; 
Taylor, Excess Land Law, supra note 56. 
72. Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1264-75 (amended 
1987) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§' 390aa-390zz-1 (1989». The history of the 
Reclamation Reform Act is detailed in Candee, supra note 23 and in Huffaker & Gard-
ner, The "Hammer" Clause of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, 26 NAT. RESOURCES 
J. 41 (1986). 
73. S. REP. No. 373, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2570, 2575. 
74. Candee, supra note 23, at 667-68. 
75. 43 U.S.C. § 390dd (1989). 
76. 43 U.S.C. § 390ee(b) (1989). Among the significant provisions in the Federal 
Reclamation Act are: 
Acreage limitation. Increased to 960 acres from 160 acres. 43 U.S.C. § 390dd. 
Residency requirement. The requirement was eliminated. 43 U.S.C. § 390kk. 
Excess lands. Subsidized water would no longer be delivered to lands in excess of 
960 acres that benefited more than 25 natural persons. 43 U.S.C. § 390bb (9); 390dd (1). 
Recordable contracts. Landowners were required to amend their existing recordable 
contracts to provide for disposition of excess lands by October 1992. 43 U.S.C. § 390 ii(a). 
New recordable contracts would provide for disposition within five years of execution. Id. 
After expiration of the contracts the Secretary of the Interior would have power of attor-
ney to sell the lands. 43 U.S.C. § 390ii(d). The statutory period was tolled when adminis-
trative actions precluded sale. 43 U.S.C. § 390ii(e). 
Price increase. The priced of water was to include operating and management (0 & 
M) costs. 43 U.S.C. § 390hh. 
The "Hammer Clause." Water Districts had the option of amending their contracts 
with landowners to conform to the RRA, or of charging full price for the water. 43 U.S.C. 
§ 390-cc(a) and (b). 
77. Candee, supra note 23 at 664-67. 
78. 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(b). The Hammer Clause has been called "the single most im-
portant reform in the act." 131 CONGo REC. S1129 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1985) (statement of 
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pre-existing contracts with the federal government to choose 
among three alternatives. These were to amend their pre-ex-
isting contracts with water users to conform to the new provi-
sions; to deliver water at the original contract price to land held 
in common ownership that did not exceed 160 acres; or to de-
liver unsubsidized water at full cost to leased landholdings ex-
ceeding 160 acres.79 
At the time the RRA was passed, many Central Valley land-
owners had long-term contracts with water districts to receive 
project water at subsidized prices for their lands in excess of 160 
acres.80 The landowners had also signed recordable contracts 
with the Secretary of the Interior requiring them to sell their 
excess lands within ten years after the date of execution of the 
recordable contract.81 The Water Districts in turn had contracts 
with the Bureau of Reclamation to receive water at subsidized 
prices.82 
B. RETROACTIVE STATUTES. 
1. The Problem Created by Retroactive Statutes 
A statute is retroactive when its legal effect extends back-
ward as well as forward from the time the statute is passed.83 A 
retroactive statute disturbs relationships predicated on the law 
Sen. Proxmire). 
79. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 801. 
80. Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 
1990). (In Barcellos & Wolfsen plaintiffs were owners of more than 1000 acres of land 
receiving federal water and had executed recordable contracts before 1976.) 
81. Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d at 816. Some landowners owned or held more 
than 100,000 acres under leases or recordable contracts. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 805. One 
customer received a ten-year taxpayer subsidy of $60 billion. Candee, supra note 23 at 
663 (citing 125 CONGo REC. 24,342 (1979)(statement of Sen. Nelson». 
82. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 801. 
83. Sturges V. Carter, 114 U.S. 511 (1885) (legislative amendment to state tax laws 
was not retrospective because it did not impose new duties or take away vested rights of 
taxpayer). In Sturges the Court noted, "[a] retrospective law ... takes away or impairs 
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation or imposes a new 
duty ... in respect to transactions and considerations already past." [d. at 519 (quoting 
The Society for Propagating the Gospel V. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 (No. 13156) (C.C. 
D.N.H. 1814». See Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retro-
active Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REV. 692 (1960). Professor Hochman defined a retroactive 
statute as one which "gives to preenactment conduct a different legal effect from that 
which it would have had without the passage of the statute." Hochman, supra. 
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as it was before passage of the statute.84 This can occur whether 
or not such a change in legal relationships was intended by the 
legislative body.811 
Retroactive statutes change "apparent obligations"86 under 
a former statute,87 the terms of private contracts,88 or contracts 
with a government agency.89 Although the language of the Con-
84. Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs, 258 U.S. 338, 340 (1922) (when 
legislature passed retroactive statute prohibiting collection of canal tolls, judgment that 
refunded tolls, issued on same day legislation passed, was valid because legislature's 
knowledge of parties that would benefit from law was too specific, even though "constitu-
tional principles must leave some play to the joints of the machine"). See Barcellos & 
Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 830-33 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fernandez, 
J., dissenting). Justice Fernandez argued that even though the judgment in Barcellos & 
Wolfsen was a consent judgment, it was a judicial act, as sacrosanct as if it had been 
entered after a full trial. [d. Justice Fernandez also suggested that in Barcellos & Wolf-
sen the right involved was not a "public right that Congress can change at will" but was 
a private vested right arising out of contracts' to which the government happened to be a 
party. [d. at 831-32 (citing Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Lynch v. United 
States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878). 
85. E.g., Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 Fed. Cas. 756 (No. 
13156) (C.C. D.N.H. 1814). See Hochman, supra note 83 at 692 n.3.· 
86. Norman v. Baltimore & O.RR, 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (Congress may pass tariffs, 
bankruptcy acts, declarations of war, or embargos that can impair contracts). [d. at 305 
(quoting Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 457, 549-51 (1870». 
87. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 
(1878). See also Education Assistance Corp. v. Cavazos, 902 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(federal government requirement, under amended statute, that state agency return stu-
dent loan funds, did not effect unconstitutional taking of the agency's property or due 
process violation because funds were not property within the meaning of the fifth 
amendment). United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. I, 21-25 
(1977) (legislature created a "statutory bond covenant" on which purchasers of bonds 
financing a government installation relied; a statutory contract had been created). 
88. E.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986) (statutory 
amendment prohibiting withdrawal of funds from Multiemployer Pension Plan that af-
fected pre-existing agreements with private corporations effected no taking of private 
property without compensation because there was no permanent appropriation of com-
panies' funds); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. RA. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984) 
(Multiemployer Amendments Act, guaranteeing pension payments to employees of em-
ployers who withdrew from pension plans did not impose liability for employees' vested 
benefits on employers without due process, even though effective date of amendment was 
five months before passage of Act); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905) (down-
stream riparian owners' prior contract right to enforce removal of upstream owners' dam 
invalidated retroactively by South Carolina law that endorsed wetlands drainage as im-
plementing public purpose of increasing tax base). Compare Allied Structural Steel v. 
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 246 (1978) (state law that increased obligations of employers 
who terminated pension plan violated Contract Clause because retroactive impairment of 
contracts was substantial); United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 
1 (1977). 
89. E.g., Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 
(1986) (state agency contract with federal government under statute that permitted 
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stitution prohibits both the federal90 and state91 governments 
from passing ex post facto laws, a civil statute may have retroac-
tive effect92 as long as constitutional rights9S are not infringed.9' 
In 1810,911 the Supreme Court found that retroactive laws affect-
ing government contracts could be constitutiona1.96 
Retroactive passage of a statutory amendment permits the 
government to breach, amend or invalidate its own contract 
without private party's having the same privilege.97 The non-
withdrawal from social security system with notice, ineffective against amended statute 
which prohibited withdrawal, and which was passed after notice of withdrawal had been 
given but before it took effect); FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958) (apart-
ment house developer insured under Federal Housing Act of 1948 did not have implied 
right to continue rentals to transients after statutory amendment specifically prohibiting 
such rentals was passed in 1954). As sovereign, the United States has the power to enter 
into contracts with private parties and other government agencies, and a concomitant 
duty to honor those contracts. Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 52 (citing Perry v. United 
States, 234 U.S. 330, 350-54 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934». 
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3: "No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed." 
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1: "No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law . 
. . . " The Contract Clause also limits retroactivity in state laws: "No State shall ... pass 
any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
Compare CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9: "A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing 
the obligation of contracts may not be passed." 
92. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (Connecticut law that retroac-
tively invalidated probate court award not constitutionally prohibited ex post facto law, 
because even though retrospective action deprived plaintiffs of property rights, purpose 
of ex post facto clause was to secure a person from injury or punishment, and clause was 
limited to legislation criminalizing a pre-existing fact or action). 
93. Hochman, supra note 83 at 694. 
94. Calder, 3 U.S. at 393. In Calder, the Court noted, 
[Only) one instance can be found in which a British judge 
called a statute, that affected contracts made before the stat-
ute, an ex post facto law .... If the term ex post facto law is 
to be construed to include and to prohibit the enacting of any 
law, after a fact, it will greatly restrict the power of the federal 
and state legislatures. 
[d. But see Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878) In Sinking Fund, the Court stated, 
[T)he alterations must be reasonable; they must be made in 
good faith, and be consistent with the object and scope of the 
act of incorporation. Sheer oppression and wrong cannot be 
inflicted under the guise of amendment or alteration. 
[d. at 721 (quoting Shields v. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319, 324 (1877». 
95. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). See Zigler, Takings Law and the 
Contract Clause: A Takings Law Approach to Legislative Modifications of Public Con-
tracts, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1447 n.5 (1984). 
96. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. at 137. 
97. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. at 737 (Strong, J. dissenting). Justice Strong pro-
posed that when government has entered into a contract with a private party, it has 
"deposed" its constitutional authority, exchanging the "character of legislator for that of 
15
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governmental party suffers both because the legislation may im-
pose new duties and liabilities,S8 and because the government's 
sovereign right to amend legislation limits the rights and reme-
dies that can be asserted against the government as breaching 
party.ss The net effect is that a non-federal party risks that its 
a moral agent, with the same rights and obligations as an individual." Id. at 731 (citing 3 
Hamilton's Works at 518, 519). Since the power to affect contract terms by retroactive 
legislation, changing the stipulations of the contract and imposing additional liabilities 
upon a contractor with the government, is not an enumerated Congressional power, said 
Justice Strong, it is not constitutional for Congress to do so. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 
U.S. at 732. 
98. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976). 
99. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 581-82 (1934). In the case of a federal 
government contract, the rights that can be asserted are limited to constitutional rights, 
or rights that have been conferred by a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, such as 
is provided by the Tucker Act. Lynch, 292 U.S. at 580-82. In Lynch, the government 
contended that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, because the United 
States had withdrawn its consent to be sued under the "Economy Act" of March 20, 
1933. The Economy Act had included a clause providing that "all laws granting or per-
taining to yearly renewable term insurance are hereby repealed." Id. at 515. However, 
the original War Risk Insurance Act had contained an express waiver of sovereign immu-
nity from suit. Id. at 581. This right to sue was not effectively repealed by the Economy 
Act. Id. at 586. The Court in Lynch stated, "The sovereign's immunity from suit ... 
applies alike to [actions] arising under acts of Congress and to those arising under some 
violation of rights conferred upon the citizens by the Constitution." Id. at 582 (citations 
omitted). 
In federal reclamation law, several causes of action have been dismissed by the Su-
preme Court and courts of appeal on the ground that there had been no waiver of sover-
eign immunity. E.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) (injunction suit by private par-
ties against the United States, requesting a "physical solution" to interference with 
previous water supply by newly constructed dam, failed for lack of consent); City of 
Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963) (municipality's suit against the United States 
sought injunction against continued operation of Friant Dam and declaratory relief as to 
water rights but failed for lack of consent); Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 
1969) (Bureau officials who refused to deliver water to school district owning more than 
160 acres fell within the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity, thus imposing lia-
bility on the federal government, because they were acting without authority). Compare 
Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937) (even where sovereign immunity not waived, individual 
federal officials could be joined as indispensable parties where enforcement of govern-
ment order would deprive landowners of vested rights in water). See also Barcellos & 
Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 491 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ca1.l980) (federal govern-
ment consented to suit on water contracts in the Tucker Act). The Department of the 
Interior had disputed the validity of a 1963 contract between Westlands and the Depart-
ment, and had threatened not to deliver water under the contract. Barcellos & Wolfsen, 
491 F. Supp. at 264. The Department said that unless "substantial concessions were 
made in regard to salient features" of the contract by the Water District, no water would 
be delivered to Westlands from federal sources. Id. The federal government contended 
that sovereign immunity protected it from suit. Id. The district court ruled in favor of 
the landowners, holding that the government had consented to suit in the McCarran Act 
(43 U.S.C § 666), that the plaintiffs were requesting adjudication of the rights of all the 
parties, and that under Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958), con-
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reasonable expectations of performance under the contract 
terms will not be fulfilled. 100 
2. Judicial Construction of Retroactive Statutes 
In Bowen v. Public Agencies Against Social Security En-
trapment,t°1 the Supreme Court found that the first step in re-
viewing the constitutionality of a retroactive federal law, as it 
affects a pre-existing government contract,102 is to determine 
tract interpretation must be in accordance with federal, rather than state law. Barcellos 
& Wolfsen, 491 F. Supp. at 265-67. 
100. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (Black Lung 
Amendments Act, retrospectively mandating disability compensation for miners who left 
employment before Act was passed, did not violate Due Process Clause even though it 
upset settled expectations). In Turner Elkhorn the Court noted, "[olur cases are clear 
that legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets 
otherwise settled expectations." Id. (citing Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100 (1947); Nor-
man v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 
290 U.S. 398 (1934); Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911)). Profes-
sor Hochman named the following reasons for hostility to retroactive statutes: 1) parties 
should be able to plan their actions with reasonable certainty of the legal consequences; 
2) in passing retroactive legislation, the legislature does so knowing exactly who will ben-
efit from it; 3) courts should pronounce on past behavior and legislatures should declare 
for the future. Hochman, supra note 83 at 692-93. 
101. 477 U.S. 41 (1986). In Public Agencies, the State of California had participated 
in the federal social security scheme under an agreement executed under federal law. Id. 
at 48. The agreement included a provision that states could withdraw from the system 
with two years' notice to the federal government. Id. at 49 n.13. After California filed a 
notice of intent to withdraw from the system, Congress changed the legislation to read 
that states could not withdraw after the date of passage of the amendment. Id. at 49. 
The state and its employees alleged that they had been deprived of "contract rights" 
without just compensation, that federal defendants had acted in excess of their constitu-
tional authority, and that the federal government had violated the tenth amendment. Id. 
at 49-50. The district court held there was an unconstitutional taking of property. Id. at 
50-51. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Congress had reserved the right to 
amend by providing in the original legislation that the agreements needed to be "in con-
formity with" the legislation. Id. at 53. Together with the sovereign power to amend, the 
language itself provided an adequate congressional reservation of the right to amend. Id. 
at 52-53. The Court also held that the contract right alleged by the State did not amount 
to a vested property right, subject to due process or taking protections; but rather was a 
provision of a regulatory program subject to Congressional authority. Id. at 55. 
102. Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 54-55. The Contract Clause does not apply to fed-
erallegislation. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984). 
In Gray the Court observed, " [rlecords from the ... Constitutional Convention leave no 
doubt that the Framers explicitly refused to subject federal legislation ... to the literal 
requirements of the Contract Clause." Id. at 732 n.9. Notwithstanding this distinction, 
the Supreme Court has at times used a similar analysis to construe Contract Clause chal-
lenges to state laws as is used for fifth amendment taking and due process challenges to 
federal laws. E.g., United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) 
(retroactive state law creating indefeasible statutory contract invalid because impairment 
17
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whether the rights affected are constitutionally protected. l03 
This inquiry is conducted in two parts.104 
First, the court must determine whether the federal govern-
ment had the power under any circumstances to make the chal-
lenged retroactive law. 1011 Second, if it is found that the govern-
ment may exercise its sovereign power to amend, the court must 
examine the nature of the rights that are affected by the law;106 
and whether those rights have vested beyond the government's 
power to take and are constitutionally protected. l07 
When retroactive legislation may affect a constitutional 
right, there is a presumption of constitutionality.l08 Courts are 
also required to avoid deciding issues on constitutional grounds 
where there may be some other grounds for doing SO.109 Finally, 
a court will construe a law to avoid limiting the exercise of the 
of contract not reasonable or necessary means of serving the important public purpose of 
refinancing bond issue); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905) (retroactive state law 
invalidating private contract valid because legislature has power to change- its mind); 
Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511 (1885). A state statute that survives a due process chal· 
lenge may, however, be invalidated under the Contract Clause. Gray, 467 U.S. at 733 
(less searching standards imposed on economic legislation by the due process clauses). 
103. Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 54·55. See also FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 
U.S. 84, 91 (1958). 
104. Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 52, 55. 
105. [d. at 50; FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958); Sinking Fund 
Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878). 
106. Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 55. There has been a recent increase in federal 
courts on the preliminary sovereignty/vested rights analysis to taking and due process 
challenges. E.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. 1570 (1990) (in 
stockholders' antitrust suit, statutory amendment passed between first and second dates 
of judgment, governing post·judgment interest, applied retroactively); Western Fuels· 
Utah v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (1976 provisions of Mineral Lands Leasing 
Act apply to pre·1976 leases upon lease renewal). A number of circuits have recently 
employed the sovereignty/vested rights analysis to hold that state agencies that received 
and distributed federal loan funds, and that were required to return reserve funds to the 
Department of Education, had no vested right to the funds and therefore no valid taking 
or due process claim. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Cavazos, 911 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 
1990); Education Assistance Corp. v. Cavazos, 902 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 246 (1990); Ohio Student Loan Comm'n v. Cavazos, 900 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 245 (1990); South Carolina State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. 
Cavazos, 897 F.2d 1272 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 243 (1990). 
107. Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 55-56. 
108. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15 (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 
726 (1963»; Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 487·88 (1955»; Sinking 
Fund Cases, 99 U.S. at 718. 
109. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366·67 (1984). 
18
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sovereign's authority.110 
The federal government has the sovereign's rightlll to 
amend laws to preserve the public welfare.112 Congress can thus 
enact legislation that takes away contract rights because the sov-
ereign must be able to consistently implement broad legislative 
policies that may change over time.11s The exceptions arise when 
Congress is found to be exceeding its constitutional authority;114 
when the new law would violate a constitutionally protected pri-
vate right;m or when the sovereign's right to amend has been 
surrendered in unmistakable terms.118 
110. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52, 
53 (1986). 
111. Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 307-08 (1935) ("Gold Clause" 
Amendments, making private obligations to pay in coin payable in paper money, consti-
tutional even if obligation predated passage of laws, because regulation of the economy is 
an express Congressional power that cannot be fettered by private contracts); Sinking 
Fund Cases, 99 U.S. at 721 (Congress retains the power to amend any rules included in 
original railroad charter). C{. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350-54 (1935) (when 
incurring bonded indebtedness, Congress is bound by its contractual obligations and 
Gold Clause Amendments exceeded congressional power to amend government 
obligations). 
112. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. at 720. 
113. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 470 U.S. 451 (1985) 
(Congressional amendment imposing statutory fees on private railways for Amtrak's car-
riage of private railways employees did not alter prior agreement between Amtrak and 
private railways, under which Amtrak had assumed full responsibility for all passenger 
carriage without due process). The Court in National R.R. Passenger Corp. noted, "[t)he 
principal function of a legislature is not to make contracts, but to make laws that estab-
lish the policy of the state .... Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently subject to revi-
sion and repeal .... " [d. at 466 (citing Indiana ex rei Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 
104-05 (1938». See also Keefe v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393, 397 (1944) (quoting Charles River 
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet. ) 420, 548 (1837» (continued existence of 
government would be of no great value, if by implications and presumptions, government 
was disarmed of the power necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation); Horowitz v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925) (United States when sued as a contractor cannot 
be held liable for an obstruction to the performance of the particular contract resulting 
from its public and general acts as a sovereign). Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 551 
(1870) (contracts must be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of the 
rightful authority of government and no obligation of a contract can extend to the defeat 
of legitimate government authority). 
114. Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579 (due process limits Congressional right to annul govern-
ment contracts unless the action falls within the federal police power or some other para-
mount power). 
115. Perry, 294 U.S. at 350-51; Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579. 
116. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982) (retrospective law 
passed by Indian tribe to tax oil taken under pre-existing leases did not violate Com-
merce Clause because tribe possessed sovereign power to amend with respect to its own 
contracts). See also United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700 (1987) 
(waiver by United States of sovereign authority over navigable waters will not be implied 
19
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The Supreme Court has observed that a statute operates 
retrospectively when it was the legislature's intention that it do 
SO.117 Legislative intent is determined by the plain language1l8 of 
the statute, reviewed in light of the statute's underlying pur-
pose. lID A statute designed to make "small repairs"120 in a preex-
isting administrative system, is a curative statute.121 
Language in the original legislation that expressly allows 
later amendment of contracts, or express reservation in a con-
tract of the government's right to amend122 to conform to chang-
ing legislation is sufficient for a finding of constitutionality.128 
but must be surrendered in unmistakable terms); Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to 
Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986). 
117. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984). See 
also Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 812 (1938) (tax law had no retrospective effect, based on 
legislative history). 
118. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Bonjorno 110 S. Ct. 1570, 1576-78 (1990); 
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry. 470 U.S. 451, 466 (1985). See also United States v. Sperry 
Corp., 110 S. Ct. 387, 396 (1989) (retroactive application of law awarding portion of 
claims under Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to Federal Reserve Bank satisfied na-
tional Congressional purpose of equalizing treatment of claimants); Systems Fed'n Corp. 
v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651-53 (1961) (parties cannot require court to act as an equity 
court when what is s~ught to be enforced is a statute, not a promise); Cl)arles River 
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837) (ambiguity in a United States 
government contract with a private individual must operate against the adventurer and 
in favor of the public). Compare Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 
1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1970)) 
(ambiguous contract provisions are to be construed against the drafter even if the drafter 
is the government). 
119. Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. at 1577; Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 
711 n.15 (1974). See Huffaker & Gardner, supra note 72. The authors discussed "plain 
meaning" versus legislative intent as a means of testing the validity of a retroactive stat-
ute, and how these approaches might be applied to the Reclamation Reform Act. They 
suggested that where the plain language of a statute does not sufficiently address consti-
tutional considerations of retroactivity, a court must then look to the intent of the legis-
lature. [d. at 51 (citing Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 
P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1972)). 
120. Hochman, supra note 82 at 705 n.4. 
121. Hochman, supra note 82 at 704. A curative statute rectifies previous actions by 
government officers who acted without authority, or gives effect to the original intentions 
of parties to a contract through its application to past transactions. [d. Emergency legis-
lation and retroactive tax laws receive the same treatment. [d. See Rogers v. Keokuk, 
154 U.S. 546 (1866); Johnson County v. Thayer, 94 U.S. 631 (1876). 
122. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 467-69; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 
U.S. 700, 720 (1878) (Congress has given special notice of its intention to retain full and 
complete power to make alterations and amendments of private railway charter that 
come within just scope of legislative power). 
123. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 54-
55 (1986) (section of Act reserving to Congress the power of amendment had been "ex-
20
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The sole issue is whether the language of the law or of the con-
tract amounts to an express reservation. 12' For example, in 
Bowen,12& the Court disposed of the issue of the government's 
right to amend legislation by finding that Congress had ex-
pressly reserved the right of future amendment in the original 
Act.126 
The Supreme Court also has held that the sovereign has a 
broad implied reservation of the right to amend legislation.127 In 
FHA v. The Darlington, Inc. 128 the Court held that even where a 
specific form of conduct on the part of a private party to a con-
tract is not expressly prohibited in the enabling legislation or 
pressly incorporated" into contract by contract language); FHA v. The Darlington Inc., 
358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958) (quoting Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947)) (immunity 
from federal regulation is not gained through forehanded contracts). 
124. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 467 U.S. at 467 (express statutory reservation 
of right to repeal, alter or amend statute at any time confirmed Congressional intent not 
to make a statutory contract). 
125. Bowen v. Public Agencies Against Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986). 
126. Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 52. The power to amend is very broad. See Sink-
ing Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878): "[Tlhe reservation affects the entire relation be-
tween the State and the corporation, and places under legislative control all rights, privi-
leges and immunities derived by its charter directly from the state." Id. at 720 (quoting 
Tomlinson v. Jessup, 82 U.S. (15 Wall) 454, 459 (1872)). 
127. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982). 
128. 358 U.S. 84 (1958). In Darlington, the FHA insured a construction loan under 
the Federal Housing Act for an apartment house in 1949. Id. at 85. The regulations gov-
erning the insurance provided only that the building should be used "principally" for 
residential use. Id. The apartment house owner submitted a schedule of rents to be 
charged that did not include any provision for transients but it did furnish and rent out 
some of its apartments to transients. Id. at 86. In 1954 the statute was amended ex-
pressly to exclude transient or hotel use from permitted uses for buildings mortgaged 
under the Federal Housing Act. Id. The corporation requested declaratory judgment that 
so long as it complied with the terms of the statute that were in effect when the loan was 
made, it had an implied contractual right to rent to transients. Id. at 87. The Supreme 
Court held that, in light of the legislative purpose of the FHA, which was to provide 
homes for veterans and their families, and of the fact that rental to transients was not 
expressly included in the legislation, rentals to transients could not be permitted. Id. at 
90. The Court noted that there is a presumption of constitutionality of a statute, that a 
contractual right does not rise to the level of a property right, and that- "those doing 
business in a regulated' field" are in a bad position to complain about changes made in 
the regulations. [d. at 91. 
In dissent, Justice Frankfurter observed that the scope of the legislation at issue was 
particularized rather than "broad and unfolding" like anti-trust legislation, and therefore 
was not susceptible to amendment "by judicial function." Darlington, 358 U.S. at 92. 
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, noted that since Darling-
ton had not been forbidden to make occasional transient rentals, and since the evidence 
showed that Darlington was not engaged in a scheme to subvert the purpose of the ena-
bling legislation, it should be permitted. Id. at 97. 
21
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the contract, the conduct is not permitted where it violates the 
legislative purpose of the regulatory scheme.129 Further, in Mer-
rion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe/so the Court held that the power 
to amend is abrogated only when the sovereign has "surrendered 
its power in unmistakable terms."ISl 
3. Nature of Rights Affected 
The traditional definition of property is "the group of rights 
inhering in [a] citizen's relation to [a] physical thing, as the 
right to possess, use and dispose of it.1I132 The Supreme Court 
has referred to this group of rights as a "bundle of sticks" or 
"bundle of rights" rather than the thing itself,133 and since 
129. Darlington, 358 U.S. at 87-88; Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 487 (1905) 
(state passing law that retroactively abrogated private contract possessed sovereign right 
to do so just I,IS federal government did); See also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 816 F.2d 205, 
215 (5th Cir. 1987) (courts may not set aside legislation because it is inconsistent with 
prior legislation; Congress may repeal, amend or ignore any statute it has enacted); Com-
munity Servo Broadcasting of Mid·America, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 
1978) (en banc) (in amending legislation Congress is not bound by the intent of an ear-
lier body, although it is bound by the Constitution). Congressional intent to make the 
law retroactive is a key factor in its determination of whether there is an implied reo 
served right to amend. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 467. A contract right 
is not conferred by a prior statute, and the presumption that amendatory legislation is 
constitutional is greater when an entire regulatory scheme is involved. [d. at 467-68. 
130. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
131. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 148. Having acknowledged a degree of sovereignty on the 
part of an Indian Tribe, the Court observed: 
[d. Further: 
Without regard to its source, sovereign power, even when 
unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all contracts 
subject to the sovereign's jurisdiction, and will remain intact 
unless surrendered in unmistakable terms. 
It is one thing to find that the Tribe has agreed to sell the 
right to use the land and take from it valuable minerals; it is 
quite another to find that [the sovereign) has abandoned its 
sovereign powers simply because it has not expressly reserved 
them through a contract. 
[d. at 146. See also Keefe V. Clark, 322 U.S. 393, 397 (1944) (statute in effect at time of 
sale of state bonds did not become part of bond contracts because in contracts between a 
political entity and private entities, absent a clear and unequivocal expression of the 
state's intent to bargain away its powers, there is none); City of St. Louis V. United Rys., 
210 U.S. 266, 280 (1908) (government's power to tax remains unless it has been specifi· 
cally surrendered in clear and unmistakable words). 
132. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). See also 
Schulz & Weber, Changing Judicial Attitudes Toward Property Rights in California 
Water Resources: From Vested Rights to Utilitarian Reallocations, 19 PAC. L.J. 1051, 
1033-35 (1988). 
133. Nollan V. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 857 (1987) (state law is the 
source of those strands that constitute a' property owner's bundle of property rights); 
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1960134 has not limited the definition of property to a physical 
object. 1311 The bundle includes, among other rights, the rights to 
possess, use and dispose of property, and to exclude others from 
using property.136 Property includes any estate137 that can be 
owned or transferred from one person to another.138 
Property rights are not created by the federal Constitution, 
but are conferred by state law139 or by another external system, 
such as a statute.140 However, once rights in property have been 
established, the fifth amendment guarantees that the property 
may not then be taken from the owner without due process or 
just compensation.14l 
In the Sinking Fund Cases 142 the Court stated that a valid 
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) (bundle of rights includes the right to exclude 
others and the right to pass on property to ones heirs); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 
467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (right to exclude others is one of the most essential sticks in 
the bundle of rights commonly characterized as property); United States v. Security In-
dus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 76 (1982) (bundle of rights of a secured party is smaller than that 
of an owner in fee simple, but it can still be property subject to a taking by retroactive 
governmental action); PVM Redwood Co., Inc. v. United States, 686 F.2d 1327, 1332 (9th 
Cir. 1982)(current notions of property adopt a bundle of rights analysis, based on the 
notion of a set of legal relations or relationships among persons with respect to things). 
134. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960). 
135. PVM Redwood Co., 686 F.2d at 1332 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citing Oakes, 
"Property Rights," Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583 (1981)). The 
dissent noted, "[w)hile the generic term "property" refers to land, possessions and incor-
poreal entitlements, the concept of property embodies the 'fruition of a number of expec-
tancies.' " I d. 
136. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984). 
137. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 76 (1982) (although bundle 
of rights accruing to a secured party is smaller than that of an owner in fee sil1lple, this 
does not relegate the secured party's interest to something less than property). 
138. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) (bundle of rights includes the right to 
exclude others and the right to pass on property to one's heirs). 
139. E.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 857 (citing Hughes v. 
Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295) (1967)); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) 
(state law controls disposition of federal irrigation water rights in the Central Valley 
Project); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1971) (property rights protected 
by due process are defined by state law or other independent source of rules and under-
standings); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 742-43 (1950) (state 
law entitled owners of riparian rights to compensation for deprivation of property rights 
by Bureau of Reclamation dam construction). 
140. United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,21-25 (1977). 
141. U. S. CONST. amend. V. 
142. 99 U.S. 700 (1878). In the Sinking Fund Cases Congress had chartered a pri-
vate corporation to build railways, and had subsidized bonds issued by the corporation. 
[d. at 719. The railway was to repay principal and interest to the United States. Id. In a 
separate transaction, the government used the services of the railways to transport 
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contract, either executory or executed, is property.143 In most 
cases, however, such a right has not been found to be protected 
by the fifth amendment's Takings Clause if the contract has 
been altered by a legitimate government action. 144 
troops during the Civil War. [d. at 701. The railway billed the government for approxi-
mately $10,500. [d. Instead of paying the bill directly to the railroad, the government, 
acting under a federal statute, paid half of it into a "sinking fund" in the treasury, to 
help offset the accrued interest and principal of the bonded indebtness. [d. The railway 
sued in the court of claims for the remainder, alleging unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty without due process. [d. at 703. The Supreme Court held that since the original 
legislation had expressly reserved the right of amendment, there was no taking. [d. at 
728,730. 
A statute is primarily read as not creating a contract in itself. Bowen v. Public Agen-
cies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 479 U.S. 41, 55 (1986); National R.R. Passenger 
Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 470 U.S. 451 (1985): "[A]bsent some clear indication 
that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption is that 'a law is 
not intended to create private contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to 
be pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise.' " National R.R. Passenger Corp., 
470 U.S. at 465-66 (quoting Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937». 
143. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878). The Court observed: 
The United States are as such bound by their contracts as are 
individuals. If they repudiate their obligations, it is as much 
repudiation, with all the wrong and reproach that term im-
plies, as it would be if the repudiator had been a State or a 
municipality or a citizen. 
[d. at 719. See also National R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. 451 (1985) (two-prong test 
for whether there is a vested contract right: plaintiffs must show they had such a right 
before statute was passed and there was constitutional impairment of their pre-existing 
right by the statute); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (valid contracts 
are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state or the 
United States). 
144. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986) (contractuallimi-
tation of employer's liability to pension plan not compensable property even though 
amendment to legislation governing plan increased employer liability, because govern-
ment interference with employer's property rights arose from public program that ad· 
justs the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good). Even 
though the legislation disregards or destroys existing contractual rights, it does not al· 
ways mean there has been an illegal taking. [d. at 224 (citing Bowles v. Willingham, 321 
U.S. 503, 517 (1944); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508-10 
(1923». The Court in Connolly noted, however: "[t]his is not to say that contractual 
rights are never property rights or that the government may always take them for its 
own benefit without compensation .... " Connolly, 475 U.S. at 224 (citing Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 
U.S. 264 (1981); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978». 
In the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878) the government action was legiti-
mately taken by an express Congressional reservation of the right to amend, which was 
included in the original legislation. [d. at 720. In general, retroactive legislation is seen as 
valid if it affects a remedy but not if it affects a right. FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 
84,92 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 
586 (1934) (when retroactive legislation completely destroys a remedy but not the right, 
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In Lynch u. United States 141l the Supreme Court held that 
insurance policies bought by veterans of World War I, as well as 
compensation granted to veterans for the insurance premiums, 
were property within the protection of the fifth amendment's 
Due Process Clause.146 Even though the policies contained an 
express provision that they should be "subject to all amend-
ments to the original act,"147 subsequent legislation, which re-
pealed all laws granting or pertaining to yearly renewable term 
insurance,148 could not invalidate the United States' prior con-
sent to be sued on its pre-existing contracts.149 
A right that is conferred as part of a regulatory scheme has 
some of the indicia of ownership but not all. 1llo In FHA u. The 
Darlington, Inc.,llli although the owners of an apartment house 
inferred an implied contract right from statutory language that 
did not expressly forbid a certain kind of conduct,11l2 the Court 
parties have no recourse; but if the right is destroyed, there may be a fifth amendment 
violation). 
145. 292 U.S. 571 (1934). See also United States Trust Co. of New York v. New 
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21-25 (1977); compare National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, T. 
& S.F. Ry., 470 U.S. 451, 468 (1985) (court will not lightly construe that which is un-
doubtedly a scheme of public regulation to be, in additional, a private contract to which 
the state is a party); Keefe v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393 (statute in force at issuance of special 
assessment drain project bonds was not a part of bond contract and could be changed by 
legislature). 
146. Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579. 
147. [d. at 577. 
148. [d. at 575. 
149. [d. at 583. The Court noted that Congress's purpose in passing the Economy 
Act of 1933 was to abolish rights to insurance, rather than remedies to recover rights 
that had already vested. Id. at 586. 
150. Education Assistance Corp. v. Cavazos, 902 F.2d 617, 627 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, III S. Ct. 246 (1990) (reserve student loan funds held by state agency were not 
"property" for purposes of the Due Process Clause because right to funds was deter-
mined by federal law which dictated the existence, content and uses of fund, and Con-
gress had reserved the right to amend legislation). See also Ohio Student Loan Comm'n 
v. Cavazos, 900 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 245 (1990); South Caro-
lina State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Cavazos, 897 F.2d 1272 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 243 (1990). 
151. 358 U.S. 84 (1958). 
152. FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (when federally insured apart-
ment house owner's contract with government did not expressly prohibit rentals to tran-
sients they did not have a pre-existing implied right to do so). The Court noted, "[t]hose 
who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is but-
tressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end." Id. at 91. See also 
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (an implied contract against government interfer-
ence with use of property cannot be inferred when an express contract would not be 
permissible). 
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did not allow this.11l3 In Darlington, the Court found that such 
an implied right did not equal a vested right. 111. 
4. Constitutional Limitations on Sovereign Power: Taking and 
Due Process 
In the fifth amendment, the Constitution provides two ba-
ses for challenging a government action that has deprived a 
party of vested rights. lllll Private property may not be taken for 
public use without the owner receiving just compensation in re-
turn,11l6 and property may not be taken without due process. 1117 
A government action that deprives a property owner of all 
economically viable use of its property, without payment of com-
153. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) (where a federal statutory scheme 
set up an War Risk Insurance Plan for totally disabled veterans, insurance contracts 
purchased under the plan remained valid after the law was repealed). 
154. Darlington, 358 U.S. at 90. 
155. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." Id. See Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878) (Congress's 
express reservation of the right to amend legislation governing railroads' repayment con-
tract obligations to the federal government settled the question of whether there was an 
unconstitutional deprivation of property). In his dissent, Justice Strong noted that these 
fifth amendment rights originated with the Magna Carta. Id. at 737. 
156. E.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) Uust compensation clause designed to bar government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which should be borne by public); 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016-17 (1984) (compensation under the 
Tucker Act, not injunctive relief, is the remedy for a regulatory taking absent express 
Congressional withdrawal of Tucker Act jurisdiction); California v. United States, 438 
U.S. 645, 671 (1978); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. 
McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 290 (1958) (if imposition of federal conditions for receipt of 
water impaired vested rights in water, the remedy was compensation); United States v. 
Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (when federal government action has de-
prived a private landholder of riparian rights, compensation, not injunctive relief, is the 
remedy). 
157. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Property may be taken for public use with due process, 
however. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The government entity properly takes 
property by eminent domain proceedings, condemning the property, and paying compen-
sation to the landowner. E.g., City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 624, 630 (1963); 
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 616 (1963) (Congress authorized taking of vested water 
rights by eminent domain proceedings); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 
U.S. 725, 732 (1950) (when federal government action deprived a private landholder of 
state law riparian rights, the government must institute eminent domain proceedings 
and compensate the landowner). Due process further requires adequate notice to the 
parties affected. 
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pensation, has effected a regulatory taking.1118 The taking can be 
of physicaPll9 or incorporeaP6o property. The remedies are com~ 
pensation161 or a judicial declaration that the law or action is 
unconstitutional. 162 
In Ruckelshaus u. Monsanto CO.163 the Court determined 
that a trade secret could be property subject to a fifth amend-
ment protection under a federal statute.164 However, after the 
law was amended to remove a prohibition against use of the in-
formation for product evaluation, there was no taking. 1611 The 
158. E.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (state law re-
quiring coal companies to retain underground support for surface owners violated the 
Takings Clause and was unconstitutional). 
159. E.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304 (1987) (campground); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419 (1982) (New York City ordinance requiring apartment house owner to permit 
cable TV installations on his property effected a physical taking); United States v. Ger-
lach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (riparian rights). 
160. E.g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 110 S. Ct. 387 (1989) (fees on awards from 
impounded Iranian funds); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (aid to families with 
dependent children); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (Indians' individual rights to 
fractional share of trust for benefit of tribe); Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social 
Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986) (state government's contractual right to withdraw 
from federal Social Security plan); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 
(1986) (pension funds); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (trade 
secrets); United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982) (creditors' rights 
under new bankruptcy law); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (material-
men's liens under state law); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) (War Risk 
Insurance contracts created under federal statute). Only in rare instances has the Court 
found these rights protected, or compensation the appropriate remedy. See, e.g., Mon-
santo, 467 U.S. 986; Armstrong, 364 U.S. 40; Lynch, 292 U.S. 571. 
161. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
162. E.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 (1980) (under California law the sole 
remedies for inverse condemnation are mandamus and declaratory judgment). 
163. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). In Monsanto, secret information had been submitted to 
the Environmental Protection Agency for use in pesticide evaluation under a series of 
amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 
164. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04. The Court determined that trade secrets and 
commercial and financial information submitted between 1947 and 1972 under the origi-
nal FIFRA were not protected by the Taking Clause. Id. at 1013. In 1972, however, Con-
gress expressly prohibited the EPA from public disclosure of a trade secret or from using 
secret data submitted by one company to evaluate a product submitted by a second 
company statute. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1010-14. Information submitted under the 1972 
version of the Act, however, could be protected. Id. at 1010, 1013. 
165. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013. In Monsanto, the Court noted that a taking of 
property is determined by the deprivation of the owner, rather than by any accretion to 
the sovereign. Id., at 1004-05 (citing United States v. General Motors. Corp., 323 U.S. 
373,378 (1945». The Court did not discuss the issue of retroactivity in Monsanto, except 
by implication. A central question in Monsanto, however, was whether amendments to 
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Court in Monsanto noted that there is no set formula for deter-
mining when justice and fairness require that economic injuries 
caused by public action amount to a compensable taking. ISS The 
Court identified several factors to be taken into account when a 
taking claim is asserted: 1) the character of the governmental 
action; 2) its economic impact; and 3) the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations. ls7 
The Court emphasized that a reasonable investment-backed 
expectation was more than a unilateral expectation or abstract 
need. ls8 The Court held that Monsanto Co. had no basis for a 
an environmental statute can be applied to property that was protected under an earlier 
statute. Id. at 1011-12. See also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 
(1986) (Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, retroactively requiring 
companies that withdrew from pension plan to pay their share of the plan's unfunded 
liabilities, was not an unconstitution",l taking of property under the fifth amendment 
because amendment was made within the framework of a regulated field, contractual 
rights under the legislation did not rise to the level of property rights, and employers 
had adequate notice that participation might trigger additional financial obligations). 
166. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 
175 (1979) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978»; 
accord Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295 
(1981)). 
167. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005 (citing Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 
U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978». See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493-98 (1987); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 
U.S. 211, 224-28 (1986); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 
(1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
168. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005-06 (citing Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beck-
with, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980». The Court held that even though the 1978 amendments 
to FIFRA required Monsanto to give up its property interest in the data, this was a 
burden in return for which Monsanto received the ability to market pesticides in this 
country. Id. The Court further noted that the burden was one Monsanto was apparently 
willing to bear, since the company had continued to expand its research and develop-
ment and to submit data to EPA after the 1978 FIFRA amendments were passed. Id. 
See also United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 (1985) (vested economic right to 
income flow is subject to government's power to regulate for the public good and to 
redistribute benefits and burdens of economic life; unperfected mining claim must be 
taken by claimant with understanding that government retains substantial regulatory 
power over owner's property interests); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (government action may cause economic harm without interfering 
with interests that are sufficiently bound up with the owner's reasonable expectations to 
constitute property for fifth amendment purposes»; Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining 
Co., 428 U.S. I, 16 (1976». Ct. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1978) 
(Army Corps of Engineers' interference with a private developer's reasonable investment 
backed expectations amounted to a taking). See also Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. 
v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (mere unilateral expectation or abstract need is not a 
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taking challenge since such restrictions were burdens that must 
be borne in exchange for the advantage of living and doing busi-
ness in a civilized community. 169 
The Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment protects 
both property and contract rights.170 A due process challenge to 
property interest entitled to protection); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (law 
prohibiting Indians from selling feather ornaments from endangered bird species did not 
unconstitutionally take Indians' property because interest in an anticipated gain is 
viewed as less compelling than property-related interests); PVM Redwood Co., Inc. v. 
United States, 686 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Omnia Co. v. United States, 
261 U.S. 502 (1923)) (frustration and appropriation are essentially different things)). 
169. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 983, 1007 (1986) (citing Andrus v. Al-
lard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979)). Further, government imposition of burdens was an expected 
part of the privilege of doing business in an area that had long been the subject of public 
concern and government regulation. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007. 
See also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986). The 
Court in Connolly held that an interference with the property rights of an employer, 
arising from a public program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good, does not constitute a compensable taking (citing Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining 
. Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1976); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) and Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 1922)). In Connolly, in holding there was no taking, 
the Court also cited Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 732; 
(1984); FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958) and Turner Elkhorn, 428 
U.S. at 15-16, to emphasize that employers had more than adequate notice that they 
were doing business in a regulated field, that withdrawal might trigger additional finan-
cial obligations, and that there might be amendments to achieve the legislative purpose 
to promote the common good. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 226. In Monsanto, the Court held 
that as long as Monsanto was aware of the conditions under which the data were submit-
ted, and the conditions were rationally related to a legitimate government interest, there 
was no taking. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007, 1013, 1017. 
The requirement in Monsanto that companies be aware of the conditions imposed 
amounts to a due process notice requirement. See Bowen v. Public Agencies Against 
Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 54 (1986); Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 
(1878). 
170. E.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Due 
process includes notice and a right to be heard. Notice is interpreted broadly in favor of 
the government when the government's own contracts are affected. E.g., Bowen v. Public 
Agencies Against Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52-54 (1986) (where a state gov-
ernment agency had a contract with the federal government that provided for cancella-
tion of the agreement with notice, language in the statute providing that the agreements 
must conform to the law was sufficient notice to state that the government had expressly 
reserved a right of amendment). See also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & 
Co., 467 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1984); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 
296 (1958) (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 113 (1941)) (it is not lack of due 
process for government to regulate that which it subsidizes). The implication is that a 
private party doing business with the government is, by that very fact, put on notice that 
its previous contracts may by changed. Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 54; Merrion v. Ji-
carilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147-48 (1982)(contractual arrangements remain sub-
ject to subsequent legislation by the presiding sovereign). See also Norman v. Baltimore 
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a retroactive statute examines whether the retroactivity itself 
impairs property or contract rights171 even if the statute, as a 
prospective measure, would be constitutional.172 
Congress may not modify an existing federal contract if in 
doing so it deprives the other party of contract benefits that 
have already been reduced to possession.173 Even if the contract 
rights were not vested property rights,I" however, a statute that 
impairs contracts may be subject to a due process challenge. In 
In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & CO.17S 
the Court set forth a rational basis analysis177 for a due process 
& O.RR, 294 U.S. 240, 307-08 (1935) (citing Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 
349, 357 (1908) "Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of 
congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject 
matter which lies within the control of congress, they have a congenital infirmity.") See 
also Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1878) (express reservation by Congress of 
right to amend satisfies due process notice requirement). Ct. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 
467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984) (when company is dealing in a regulated field and is aware that 
conditions attach to its submission of trade secrets to a government agency, there is no 
taking as long as the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest). 
171. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. RA. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984) 
(quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. I, 16-17 (1976». 
172. Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 16-17. 
173. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 54 
(1986) (citing Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 720 (1878». 
174. Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 55. 
175. Board of Regents v. Roth, 407 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972). 
176. 467 U.S. 717 (1984). 
177 . [d. at 729-30. Statutes that retroactively change the terms of a pre-existing 
contract are presently accorded rational basis scrutiny because they are economic legisla-
tion. Gray, 467 U.S. at 729 (quoting Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15-16). To pass the 
rational basis test a statute must satisfy two requirements: 1) the law shall not be unrea-
sonable, arbitrary or capricious; 2) the means selected shall have a real and substantial 
relation to the objective sought to be attained. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 
(1934). The Gray rational basis standard was reasserted in National RR Passenger 
Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 470 U.S. 451 (1985): "Congress' decision ... is rational 
and reasoned, and the railroads have failed to demonstrate a due process violation." [d. 
at 478. 
See also Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15-20 (retroactive application of federal law 
requiring companies to pay compensation to miners suffering from black lung disease did 
not violate due process, because Act was a rational means of achieving legislative purpose 
of spreading liability among employers). The Court in Turner Elkhorn also stated an 
"arbitrary and irrational" standard for a due process violation of contract rights, noting 
that the standard for retrospective legislation is more demanding than for prospective 
legislation. [d. at 17. It is not clear whether the "arbitrary and irrational" standard dif-
fers from the rational basis standard as applied in Turner Elkhorn and subsequent cases 
or whether they are alternative applications of the same rule. The Court in Gray used a 
rational basis analysis and an "arbitrary and irrational" standard, seemingly inter-
30
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to retroactive legislation.178 The 





In United States v. Security Industrial BankI80 the Court 
distinguished "property" as defined for the Takings Clause from 
"property" that can raise a due process challenge. I81 A property 
changeably. Gray, 467 U.S. at 729 (arbitrary and irrational standard for due process 
challenge applies in absence of a vested property right). The Court in Gray also noted 
that retroactive legislation may not be "harsh or oppressive." Id. at 733 (citing U.S. 
Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 n.13 (1977). See also Gray, 467 U.S. at 
732: "[TJhat standard does not differ from the prohibition against arbitrary and irra-
tional legislation ... enunciated in Turner Elkhorn . ... " See Huffaker & Gardner, 
supra note 82. The authors, who accurately predicted that retroactivity would be a key 
issue with respect to Central Valley under the RRA contracts, analyzed section 205(b) of 
the Reclamation Reform Act (the "Hammer Clause") under both heightened scrutiny 
and rational basis analyses, and concluded that the legislation would not be found con-
stitutional under either approach. Huffaker & Gardner, supra note 82 at 47-62. 
178. Gray, 467 U.S. at 729. The Court observed, "[pJrovided that the retroactive 
application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by 
rational means; judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclu-
sive province of the legislative and executive branches." Id. 
179. Bowen v. Public Agencies Against Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55 
(1986). Due process also prevents Congress from repudiating federal contracts if saving 
money is the only object. Id. 
Congressional amendments changing the terms of federal contracts have demanded 
heightened scrutiny under previous Supreme Court decisions. E.g., Perry v. United 
States, 294 U.S. 330, 350-51 (1935) (Congressional resolution providing that the Gold 
Standard no longer applied in satisfaction of contracts was unconstitutional when ap-
plied to government obligations). See also United States Trust Co. of New York v. New 
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 24-26 (1977); contra Keefe v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393, (1944) (sovereign 
may not bargain away state's power absent a clear and unequivocal purpose to do so); 
Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1033 (1989) (ambiguous con-
tract provisions should be construed against the drafter, even where the drafter is the 
government) (citing United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1970». On the 
other hand, there has been an occasional presumption that government should have a 
greater right than a private party to amend its own contracts. See Lynch v. United 
States, 292 U.S. 571, 580-81 n.9 (1934) (quoting THE FEDERALIST. No. 81 (A. Hamilton». 
In the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878) the Court found simultaneously that the 
government is bound by its contracts as any private party would be, and that Congress 
has a sovereign's right to amend legislation even when its own contractual promises are 
abrogated. The Court in the Sinking Fund Cases stated, "[tJhe United States occupy 
toward this corporation a two-fold relation, - that of sovereign and that of creditor. 
Their rights as sovereign are not crippled because they are creditors .... " Id. at 724. 
See also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 145-46 (1982)(tribe could act 
both as commercial partner and as sovereign); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. at 350-
51; Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. at 576-77. 
180. 459 U.S. 70 (1982). 
181. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 75 (noting that Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 
134 (1974) (government employment) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (wel-
fare under federal program) had defined "property" for purposes of the Due Process 
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interest protected by procedural due process extends beyond ac-
tual ownership of real estate, chattels or money.lS2 However, for 
a property interest to be protected by procedural due process: 1) 
a person must have more than an abstract need or desire for it; 
2) the claimant must have more than a unilateral expectation of 
receiving it; and 3) the claimant must have a legitimate claim of 
entitlement to it.18s In Board of Regents v. Roth,184 the Supreme 
Court explained that a constitutional purpose of due process 
protection for certain rights is that, although claimants may not 
ultimately show their rights were protected, they have a right to 
do SO.lS/I 
C. STANDING 
A party has standing under Article III of the Constitution186 
to assert a claim when it can allege a particularized injury, con-
cretely and demonstrably resulting from defendants' action that 
will be redressed by the remedy sought. ls7 A trade association 
may assert a claim on behalf of its members even where it has 
suffered no injury from the challenged activity/88 but where the 
Clause sufficiently broadly to include rights which at common law would have been 
deemed contractual). In Security Indus. Bank, the Bank's interest in secured collateral 
was held to be a property interest, because "the contractual right of a secured creditor to 
obtain repayment of his debt may be quite different in legal contemplation from the 
property right of the same creditor in the collateral." Id. at 84. See also the Sinking 
Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 721 (1878) (present prohibition against contracting debts will 
not avoid debts already incurred); Education Assistance Corp. v. Cavazos, 902 F.2d 617, 
628 (8th Cir. 1990) (whether a contractual right against the United States constitutes a 
vested property right for fifth amendment purposes depends on whether Congress re-
served power to alter the terms of the contract (citing Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed 
to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986)). 
182. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972). 
183. [d. at 577. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, 
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and) the Laws of the United States . 
. . [and) to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party .... " 
187. Bowker v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1347, 1349 (1976) (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)). See also 
United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977). See Kelley, supra 
note 57 at 630. The author discussed standing as it was interpreted by federal courts 
during the 1970s with respect to reclamation law. 
188. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 344 (1977) 
(citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U.S. 26 (1976); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)). 
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remedy sought will inure to the benefit of the association's mem-
bers actually injured.189 The association will have standing to 
sue on behalf of its members when (a) the members would have 
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests the associa-
tion seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; 
(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires 
the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.190 
A state agency may sue on behalf of its members if the 
agency performs the functions of a traditional trade association 
for all practical purposes,191 even when membership is compul-
sory.192 However, a state agency that performs a traditional gov-
ernmental function may not have standing on behalf of its mem-
bers.193 A state government may also have standing to assert 
claims on behalf of its citizens, as in parens patriae. l9" 
A party to a contract may assert the rights of third party 
beneficiaries to the contract,1911 if the parties intended to benefit 
the third party and the terms of the contract make that 
apparent. 198 
189. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 515). 
190. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344. 
191. Id. at 345. 
192. Id. 
193. Washington State Dairy Prod. Comm'n v. United States, 685 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 
1982) (tax exemption applies only to entities authorized to use a state's sovereign pow-
ers, such as irrigation districts exercising eminent domain powers, or to associations that 
perform traditional governmental functions). 
194. United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 535 (1973) (in water rights dispute Ne-
vada had the right to represent all non-federal users in its own state against California 
and federal government); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 615 (1945) (in Supreme 
Court determination of water rights of federal and state governments, states had right to 
represent their citizens in parens patriae); California v. United States, 180 F.2d 596 (9th 
Cir. 1950) (state had right to intervene in quiet title action between federal government 
and state-owned water company). 
195. Karo v. San Diego Symphony Orchestra Ass'n, 762 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1985). 
The law governing federal contracts is federal law. Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 
U.S. 407, 411 (1947). Cf, Roos-Collins, supra note 21 at 825, 848. 
196. Karo, 762 F.2d at 821-22. See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water 
Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 1990) (landowners assert they are third party benefi-
ciaries of Bureau of Reclamation contract with Water District). 
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D. WATER RIGHTS 
1. Federal Versus State Determination of Property Interests in 
Water 
Section 8 of the Reclamation Actl97 provides that the Recla-
mation Act is not to affect or interfere with state law vested 
water rights or with state law as to the "control, appropriation, 
use or distribution" of irrigation water.198 California statute de-
clares that all water within the state is the property of the peo-
ple.199 Since the people of California have a paramount interest 
in the use of all the water of the State,200 the State is to deter-
mine the way in which water is developed.201 The California 
Constitution202 states that the general welfare requires any 
rights to water or to the use of water to be limited by the rules 
of reasonable use and beneficial use.203 The ultimate decision as 
to whether State or federal law applies is in the hands of the 
Supreme Court,204 and the Court has not provided clear 
guidance. 
In Ivanhoe v. McCracken20 r, the United States Supreme 
197. 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-600 (1989). 
198. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1989). The statute reads: 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended 
to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State 
or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use or dis-
tribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right ac-
quired thereunder. 
199. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971). 
200. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 104, 105 (West 1971). 
201. CAL. WATER CODE § 105 (West 1971). The highest use of water, under Califor-
nia law, is domestic; the next highest use is for irrigation. CAL. WATER CODE § 106 (West 
1971). 
202. CAL. CONST. art X, § 2 (added as art. 14, § 3, Nov. 6, 1928; amended Nov. 5, 
1974). The Constitution also provides that the acquisition of an interest in real property 
by any government agency, including the federal government, constitutes an agreement 
that that agency will conform to California law as to the acquisition, control, use and 
distribution of the property. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 7. 
203. CAL. CONST. art X, § 2. 
204. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 289 (1958) (rights and 
duties of United States under water delivery contracts are matters of federal law on 
which the Supreme Court has the final word) (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United 
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943». Whether the Court would determine that state-law defini-
tions of water ownership (including ownership by the state) would withstand a taking 
challenge is not certain. Walston, The Public Trust and Water Rights: National Audu-
bon Society u. Superior Court, 22 LAND & WATER L.R. 701, 721-23 (1987). 
205. 357 U.S. 275 (1958). In Iuanhoe the Supreme Court reviewed four decisions in 
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Court held that section 8 was limited to federal government ac-
quisition of riparian or other vested rights for the purpose of 
dam construction.206 In all other circumstances, once Central 
Valley water rights were appropriated to the federal government 
by the state, they were retained by the federal government.207 
Thenceforth Central Valley water was to be managed by the 
government under the Property Clause208 of the Constitution.209 
The Court noted that pre-existing water rights or vested rights 
in water could, if necessary, be acquired by the federal govern-
ment, using its powers of eminent domain.21o Once water rights 
had been acquired by or appropriated to the United States, the 
which the California Supreme Court had held that the excess lands provision effected an 
unconstitutional taking of property without due process, and that proposed water dis-
trict contracts with the Bureau of Reclamation that required the districts to adhere to 
the excess lands provisions were therefore invalid. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. All Parties 
and All Persons, 47 Cal. 2d 597, 306 P.2d 824 (1957); Santa Barbara County Water 
Agency v. All Persons and Parties, 47 Cal. 2d 699, 306 P.2d 875 (1957); Madera Irrigation 
Dist. v. All Persons and Parties, 47 Cal. 2d 681, 306 P.2d 886 (1957); Albonico v. Madera 
Irrigation Dist., 47 Cal. 2d 695, 306 P.2d 894 (1957). 
In Ivanhoe v. All Parties, an in rem action, the Ivanhoe Irrigation District had sub-
mitted a contract with the Bureau of Reclamation to a state superior court for confirma-
tion. Id. at 606, 306 P.2d 824, 828. This was in accordance with federal and state law. 43 
U.S.C. § 423e; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 22670; 23225. The two named defendants were the 
California Attorney General (Edmund G. Brown, Sr.) and Courtney McCracken, who 
owned 309 acres. Id. at 607, 306 P.2d 824, 829. Intervening landowners asserted, among 
other claims, that the contracts violated the Due Process and Taking Clauses of the fifth 
amendment. Id. at 608-09, 306 P.2d 824, 830. It was also asserted that the federal gov-
ernment could not place conditions on delivery of the water to landowners. Id. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court found that waters appropriated under the proposed contracts were 
held under an express trust of which the beneficiaries were the district landowners and 
other California water users. Id. at 628,306 P.2d 824, 837. The California Supreme Court 
held that the Reclamation Act's acreage provisions were void because they violated due 
process and equal protection. Id. at 637, 306 P.2d 824, 848. 
Remanded to state court after the Supreme Court's reversal in Ivanhoe v. Mc-
Cracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958) the contracts were approved by the California Supreme 
Court in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. 
All Parties and All Persons, 53 Cal. 2d 692, 350 P.2d 69, 3 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1960); Albon-
ico v. Madera Irrigation Dist., 53 Cal. 2d 735, 350 P.2d 95, 3 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1960); Santa 
Barbara County Water Agency, 53 Cal. 2d 743, 350 P.2d 100, 3 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1960). 
206. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 291 (1958). 
207. Id. at 291-92. 
208. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The clause provides, "The Congress shall have 
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting ... Property 
belonging to the United States .... " 
209. Ivanhoe, 357 U.S. at 294. The government's power over such "federal prop-
erty" was found to be "without limitations." Id. at 294-95 (citing United States v. City & 
County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30 (1940». 
210. Ivanhoe, 357 U.S. at 291. Invoking the Supremacy Clause (Art. VI) of the Con-
stitution, the Court indicated that a state cannot compel use of "federal property" on 
terms other than those prescribed by Congress. Ivanhoe, 357 U.S. at 294-95. 
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government could make a grant to the landowners of the subsidy 
they received on water prices,an under the Welfare Clause.212 
The Court then held that the excess lands limitation was consti-
tutional under the Welfare Clause213 as a condition on the use of 
federal funds, property and privileges.214 
In 1978 the Supreme Court modified the Ivanhoe doctrine 
in California u. United States. 2111 The Court found that section 
8, read in light of the social, political and legislative history216 of 
the Act, clearly was intended to preserve the States' control over 
water rights.217 The Court distinguished218 Iuanhoe219 and other 
former decisions220 in which it had been held that state law con-
trol of water appropriated to the Bureau of Reclamation was 
limited to the acquisition of water rights or of vested interests in 
211. Id. at 295. 
212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The clause provides: "The Congress shall have 
Power To ... provide for the ... general Welfare of the United States ...... See United 
States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 736 (1950) (power of Congress to promote 
general welfare through large scale reclamation and irrigation projects is clear and 
ample). 
Id. 
213. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
214. Ivanhoe, 357 U.S. at 295. The Court said further, 
The lesson of those cases is that the Federal Government may 
establish and impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal 
interest in the project and to over-all objectives thereof. Con-
versely, a State cannnot compel use of federal property on 
terms other than those prescribed or authorized by Congress. 
215. 438 U.S. 645, 672-73 (1978). The federal government had sought to impound 
unappropriated water for the Central Valley Project. Id. at 647. The State Water Re-
sources Board had ruled that the government could only receive the water under state 
law if it agreed to and complied with conditions dealing with the water's use. CaLifornia 
v. United States, 438 U.S. at 647. The federal government sought a declaratory judg-
ment that it could impound unappropriated water without complying with state law. Id. 
at 646. The district court found that the federal government must seek a permit, but 
that the permit must be issued without conditions if water was available. United States 
v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874, 902 (1975), aff'd, United States v. California, 558 F.2d 
1347 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). 
See CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (West 1971) (all water not applied to riparian lands or 
otherwise appropriated is public water of the state and subject to appropriation under 
state law); CAL. WATER CODE § 1225 (rights to appropriate water must be initiated or 
acquired in compliance with the Water Code). 
216. California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 653-70. 
217. Id. at 664, 676-77. See also Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 121-126 
(1983). 
218. California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 670-77. 
219. 357 U.S. 275 (1958). 
220. City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 
546 (1963). 
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water.221 The Court held that the federal government should fol-
low state law to the extent that state law did not directly conflict 
with federallaw,222 and that the imposition by the state of con-
ditions on the use of water did not create such a conflict.223 
In Bryant v. Yellen224 the Supreme Court expanded the 
California v. United States doctrine. The Court held that under 
221. California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 645. See Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. 
McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 291-92 (1958); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co. 339 
U.S. 725 (1950). 
222. California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 678. 
223. Id. at 676, 679. 
224. 447 U.S. 352 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980); reh'g denied sub nom. 
California v. Yellen (1980); reh'g denied sub nom. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. Yellen, 448 
U.S. 911 (1980). Bryant involved irrigation water supplies to the Imperial Valley from 
the Colorado River which had been imported by a private company via a canal that ran 
through Mexico beginning in 1901. Bryant, 447 U.S. at 356-57. In 1929 the Boulder Can-
yon Project Act set up a federal project to dam the Colorado River and pipe the water 
directly into California. Id. at 358. The Act contained language that could have been 
read as expressly exempting prior Imperial Valley recipients of Colorado River from the 
Reclamation Act's 160-acre limit receipt of water. Id. at 360. The Act provided that the 
works be used "for irrigation and domestic uses and satisfaction of present perfected 
rights in pursuance of ... [the] Colorado River compact .... " Bryant v. Yellen, 447 
U.S. at 359. The compact, involving seven states that were to benefit from the Project, 
provided that "[p]resent perfected rights to the beneficial use of waters of the Colorado 
River System are unimpaired by this compact." Id. at 357. On the basis of a ruling by 
the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, low cost federal water was delivered to 
Imperial Valley landowners for both excess and non-excess land. Bryant, 447 U.S. at 362. 
In 1964 the Department reversed its position and issued an administrative ruling to en-
force the 160-acre limit and the residency requirement. Id. at 365. 
Compare United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093 (1976) aff'd, Tu-
lare Lake v. United States, 677 F.2d 713 (1982). The second Tulare Lake decision held 
that, even in light of California v. United States and Bryant v. Yellen, water users did 
not have any vested right in relief from excess land provisions. 
In United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977), modified 
United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 595 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1979) and amended 
United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 595 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, Bryant v. 
Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980), the Ninth Circuit had found that under Ivanhoe, the Project 
Act did not contain express language exempting Imperial Valley landowners from the 
excess lands provisions, and in light of the legislative history of the Act the lands must 
be included. Imperial Irrigation Dist. consolidated two district court cases with contra-
dictory holdings. See Yellen v. Hickel, 335 F. Supp. 200 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (in suit for 
enforcement of residency requirement by non-landowners, residency on land required for 
receipt of federally subsidized water because, if it were not, excess lands sold in the 
Imperial Valley would be priced on the basis of the appurtenant water rights); modified 
Yellen v. Hickel, 352 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Ca1.l972) (non-owners had standing to sue, and 
as a matter of law the existence of present perfected rights to water was within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court); and United States v. Impe-
rial Irrigation Dist., 322 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (Imperial Irrigation District mem-
bers not bound by residency requirements under the Boulder Canyon Act). See Kelley, 
supra note 57 (discussing the cases underlying Bryant v. Yellen). 
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section 8,2211 as construed in California v. United States, land-
holders whose water rights had been perfected before Imperial 
Valley lands were brought under the federal reclamation project 
could receive subsidized water for both excess and non-excess 
lands.226 
However, in California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission,227 the Supreme Court, interpreting section 27228 of the 
Federal Power Act (FPA),229 which is nearly identical in wording 
to section 8 of the Reclamation Act,230 held that for purposes of 
the FPA, federal law preempts state law,231 and that California 
could not impose stream flow restrictions that exceeded federal 
standards on a proposed hydroelectric plant. In FERC the Court 
distinguished California v. United States,232 noting that because 
section 8 was part of a different statutory scheme from the FP A, 
it was to be viewed in an entirely different light, even though the 
language was nearly identical.233 
225. 43 U.S.C. § 383. 
226. Bryant u. Yellen, 447 U.S. at 373-74 (since under the Flood Control Act of 1944 
Congress clearly had intended the Reclamation Act to apply to subsidized irrigation 
water delivered to lands receiving water from the Pine Flats Dam, excess lands provi-
sions apply to those lands even where construction costs had been prepaid by the water 
districts). 
227. 110 S. Ct. 2024 (1990), reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 3304 (1990) [hereinafter FERC]. 
228. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1989). The section reads: 
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or in-
tending to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of 
the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use 
or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or 
other uses, or any vested right acquired therein. 
229. Act of June 10, 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 791a-825e (1989». 
230. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1989). 
231. FERC, 110 S. Ct. at 2033. C{. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Chern. Co., 467 U.S. 
986, 1012 (1984 ) (if in taking claim against EPA Congress can pre-empt state property 
law, Taking Clause has lost all vitality). 
232. 438 U.S. 645 (1978). See Walston, State Regulation of Federally Licensed Hy-
dropower Projects: The Conflict Between California and First Iowa, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 87 
(1987) (postulating that in the Rock Creek case, the subject of the FERC decision, the 
California u. United States doctrine would prevail). 
233. FERC, 110 S. Ct. at 2032. See also National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of 
Water & Power of Los Angeles, 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1988) (federal common law nui-
sance claim for pollution of the waters of Mono Lake preempted by Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act). 
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2. California Law 
To determine ownership of water rights, California water 
law blends234 common law riparian rights235 with the doctrine of 
prior appropriation.236 California also applies237 the rules of ben-
eficial use236 and of reasonable use.239 California partially relies 
234. Attwater & Markle, Overview of California Water Rights and Water Quality 
Law, 19 PAC. L.J. 957, 959-61 (1988) (California water rights system a plural system). See 
also National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 425-26, 658 P.2d 709, 
712, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983) (state's sovereign authority to exercise continuous supervi-
sion and control over navigable state waters bars any party from claiming vested right to 
divert waters if diversion harms public trust interests). The public trust res includes 
navigation, commerce, fishing, preservation of open space, recreation and ecology. Id. at 
434-35, 658 P.2d 709, 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 356. Under the public trust doctrine, navi-
gable waters and the land underlying them are held subject to a trust over the property 
which cannot be placed beyond the direction and control of the state. Id. at 437-38,658 
P.2d 709, 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 358 (quoting Illinois Central RR v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 
387, 453-54 (1892». See also Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. 
Rptr. 790 (1971) (public trust protects environmental and recreational values). 
235. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 441, 658 P.2d 709, 
724, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 361 (1983). Riparian rights are landowners' rights to water con-
tiguous to their property, on land that is within the stream's watershed. Riparian rights 
apply only to the smallest tract in one title in the chain leading to the current owner. 
Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 528-529, 81 P.2d 533, (1938). See also 
CAL. WATER CODE § 101 (West 1971). 
Riparian rights vest absolutely in their private owners. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 
391, 4 P. 919 (1886). A riparian right that predates the statute is a vested property right. 
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. All Parties and All Persons, 47 Cal. 2d 597, 621, 306 P.2d 824, 
839 (1957). See also Palmer v. Railroad Comm'n of California, 167 Cal. 163, 138 P. 957 
(1914). A riparian right that has vested cannot be retroactively taken. See Ivanhoe v. All 
Parties, 47 Cal. 2d at 621, 306 P.2d 824, 839; Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 
200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1926), cert. dismissed, 275 U.S. 486 (1927). 
236. See also Huffner v. Sawday, 153 Cal. 86, 94 P. 424 (1908) (riparian owners who 
irrigated their lands from stream had superior rights as either riparian owners or appro-
priators against upstream diverters). See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1201-1801 (West 1971) 
(appropriation of water). 
237. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (formerly art. XIV, § 3) (added Nov. 6, 1928; amended 
1974): "[B]ecause of the conditions prevailing in this State the general welfare requires 
that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of 
which they are capable." 
238. CAL. WATER CODE § 1240 (West 1971) (appropriation must be for a beneficial 
purpose, and when water is no longer used for that purpose the right ceases). See also 
Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 
(1935). 
239. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 . Section 2 provides: 
[T]he waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of 
use of water [shall] be prevented, and ... the conservation of 
[state] waters is to be exerci~ed with a view to the reasonable 
and beneficial uses thereof in the interest of the people and 
for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow 
of water in or from any natural stream or watercourse in this 
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on the public trust doctrine,240 a common law doctrine of sover-
eign control over a public resource. 
California water belongs to the people of California.241 but 
the right to use water may be acquired by appropriation.242 
Under California law, a water right is only the right to use the 
water.248 For purposes of the statute, "water" includes the term 
"use of water."244 Such a usufructuary right to water is still con-
State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasona-
bly required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right 
does not ... extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unrea-
sonable method off use or unreasonable method of diversion of 
water. 
See also CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 1971), containing the same language. The 
rule of reasonable use is determined by the state's interest in the use, rather than 
whether the use has been beneficial to the owner of the water right. People v. Forni, 54 
Cal. App. 3d 743, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 856 (1976). The reasonableness of a particular use 
of water will vary with the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Joslin v. Marin 
Municipal Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1987). 
240. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 433-38, 658 P.2d 
709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983) (California water law incorporates elements of riparian ism, 
appropriation and the public trust doctrine). See also, National Audubon Soc'y v. De-
partment of Water & Power of Los Angeles, 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1988). See Note, 
National Audubon Society u. Department of Water: the Ninth Circuit Disallows Fed-
eral Common Law Nuisance Claim for Mono Lake Water and Air Pollution, 20 GOLDEN 
GATE U.L. REV. 209 (1990). California also recognizes prescriptive rights and pueblo 
rights. Attwater & Markle, supra note 234 at 969. Prescriptive rights are created when 
an appropriator has successfully diverted water from the riparian or appropriative allot-
ment of another for over five years, adverse to the prior owner's interest. Attwater & 
Markle, supra note 234 at 969. See Rank v. Krug, 142 F. Supp. 1 (1956), aff'd in part, 
reu'd on other grounds in part, 293 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1961), aff'd in part, reu'd on other 
grounds in part, 372 U.S. 689 (1963). Pueblo rights, deriving from Spanish land grants, 
give the city that claims them a paramount right, superseding riparian and appropriative 
rights, to the use of waters of a river flowing through the city. Attwater & Markle, supra 
note 234 at 969. See CAL. WATER CODE § 106.5 (municipal water rights); Los Angeles v. 
Hunter, 156 Cal. 603, 105 P. 755 (1909). 
241. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (state ownership of water; right to use). 
242. [d. See also CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (West 1971) (unappropriated water not 
already vested in riparian owners may be 'appropriated in accordance with the Code). 
The legislature moved in 1987 to protect California streams from depletion by limiting 
the appropriations that may be approved in a "fully appropriated stream system." CAL. 
WATER CODE §§ 1205-07 (West 1971 & Supp. 1991). See People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 
301, 605 P.2d 859, 162 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1980). 
243. CAL. WATER CODE § 1001 (West 1971)(no right, title or interest to or in the 
corpus of any water is given or confirmed by the statute). In Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249 
(1853), the California Supreme Court observed, "it is laid down by our law writers, that 
the right of property in water is usufructuary, and consists not so much of the fluid itself 
as the advantage of its use." ld. at 252 (italics in original). See also Rancho Santa Mar-
garita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533 (1938). 
244. CAL. WATER CODE § 1000 (West 1971). 
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sidered to constitute a vested property right, however.245 
3. Water Rights in Federal Reclamation Law 
Under the Reclamation Act246 water rights are appurtenant 
to the land irrigated.247 Under this rule water rights may be con-
sidered to be a property right. 248 Under the Act,249 as in Califor-
nia law2lio rights in water are subject to beneficial use.2Iil The 
Reclamation Act also includes section 8,21i2 which by its language 
makes reclamation law subordinate to California law.2lis 
Since the federal government has jurisdiction over navigable 
245. Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 13, 142 (1857). See Schulz & Weber, supra note 132 
at 1049-50 (1988). 
246. 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1989). "The right to the use of water acquired under the provi-
sions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated .... " Compare Israel v. 
Morton, 549 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1977) (by contrast with natural flow water which is 
appurtenant to land irrigated, project water is subject to terms and conditions set by the 
United States). 
247. 43 U.S.C. § 372. A thing is "appurtenant" to something else when it stands in 
relation of an incident to a principal and is necessarily connected with the use and enjoy-
ment of the principal property. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). Under federal 
law a water right becomes appurtenant to land when the water has actually been benefi-
cially used on the land. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 126 (1983). It may be that 
this provision reflects a proposal made by John Wesley Powell that the right to use water 
should inure in the land to be irrigated, and water rights should go with land title. Sax, 
supra note 4, § 110.1 at 117. Powell reasoned that if land titles and water rights were' 
severed, water rights might all be purchased by irrigation companies and landowners 
would then be "at the mercy of the owner of the water right," creating "an intolerable 
burden to the people." Sax, supra note 4, § 110.1 at 117 (quoting Powell, Report on the 
Lands of the Arid Region). But compare Ivanhoe v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 297 (1958) 
(Reclamation Act designed to benefit people, not land); Taylor, Excess Land Law, supra 
note 56 at 497: "Legislative history of the reclamation law shows that appurtenance was 
not intended to vest as an unconditional property right." Professor Taylor made it clear 
that in his view, "[a]ppurtenance does not equate water ownership with land ownership, 
but even if it did, conditions limiting an owner's use of land to which he holds fee title 
are well known to the law, whether written in the deed or imposed by ordinance or stat-
ute .... " 
248. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 126 (1983); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 94 
(1937). 
249. 43 U.S.C. § 372 (beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of 
the right). 
250. CALIF. CONST. art. X § 2; CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 1989). 
251. United States v. Alpine Land and Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 
1983); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 92-95 (1937). See Roos-Collins, supra note 21 at 840-43. 
252. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1989). 
253. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); United States v. Orr Ditch Co., 
914 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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waters under the Commerce Clause,2&' questions can arise as to 
whether taking of riparian rights is compensable under the Tak-
ings Clause. 21111 
In Ickes v. Fox,'J.!i6 the Supreme Court held that under the 
Reclamation Act, landowners who had fully paid their share of 
construction and operating and maintenance costs2117 had ac-
quired a fully vested right to the amount of water necessary to 
"beneficially and successfully" irrigate their land,2118 and that the 
right was appurtenant to the land irrigated under the Reclama-
tion Act.2119 
In United States v. Gerlach Live Stock CO.,260 the Court in-
terpreted the California Constitution's statement of water 
rights261 to hold that in the Central Valley reclamation project, 
state law riparian rights took priority over the federal govern-
ment's navigation powers because of the language of Section 8262 
and were compensable.26s The Court discussed the doctrines of 
254. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. See also United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 
399 U.S. 725 (1950). 
255. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945). 
256. 300 U.S. 82 (1937). The government argued that as the appropriator of the 
water, the United States had become the owner of the water rights, and that the land-
owners had only a contract right against the government. [d. at 83. Cf, Ivanhoe Irrigation 
Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958). See Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136 (1857) (prior 
appropriator has vested right to use of water). See also Bell & Johnson, State Water 
Laws and Federal Water Uses: The History of Confliot, The Prospects for Accommoda-
tion. 21 ENV. L.R. (1991). The authors stated, "An important characteristic of the appro-
priative water right is that, once vested, it becomes a constitutionally protected property 
interest .... " [d. at 5. 
257. Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. at 94-95. Cf, United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 677 
F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1982). 
258. Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. at 92-95. 
259. [d. at 95-96. See 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1989) (water rights appurtenant to the land 
irrigated). 
260. 339 U.S. 725 (1950). 
261. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. 
262. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 739 (1950). The Court 
observed: "Whether required to do so or not, Congress elected to recognize any state-
created rights and to take them under its power of eminent domain." The Court noted 
that federal law adopts that of the state as the test of federal liability. [d. at 743. See 
also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963), arising out of the same litigation as did Ger-
lach. The Court held that when valid state law rights of landowners have been interfered 
with, there has been a partial compensable taking rather than a mere trespass. [d. at 620. 
263. Gerlach, 339 U.S. at 753. The Bureau had previously contracted with the ripa-
rian claimants to purchase some of the rights at issue in the Supreme Court case, and 
had placed money in escrow to pay for the rights if the Supreme Court ruled against the 
claimants. [d. at 740-42. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, said that there are no pri-
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riparian rights and prior appropriation, noting that the United 
States stood in the position of an upstream appropriator for a 
beneficial use.264 
In City of Fresno v. California,26r> the Court decided the 
rights of the city of Fresno to underground water, the City's pri-
ority to the use of water for municipal or domestic purposes, and 
its entitlement to receive water at the same price irrigators 
would pay.266 The Court held, following Ivanhoe v. Mc-
Cracken,267 that the federal government had statutory authority 
to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire water rights 
of others,268 and that the nature of those rights was to be deter-
mined by state law.269 As to the priority of rights, however, the 
city's rights were subordinate to those of the Bureau of Recla-
mation, and the price was at the discretion of the Secretary of 
the Interior.270 
4. Retroactivity in Federal Water Law 
In Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Department of the Inte-
rior,271 Central Valley landowners challenged a 1987 amendment 
vate property rights in the waters of a navigable river, and conformity with Reclamation 
Act authorization to acquire rights was satisfied by filing of notice of appropriation 
under state law. Id. at 756-60. 
264. Id. at 742-43. 
265. 372 U.S. 627 (1963). City of Fresno arose out of the construction of the Friant 
Dam, the same project litigated in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 
(1950) and in Dugan v. Rank, 327 U.S. 609 (1963). 
266. City of Fresno, 372 U.S. at 628-29. 
267. 357 U.S. 275 (1958). 
268. City of Fresno, 372 U.S. at 630. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 630-31. 
271. Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 816, cert. 
denied sub nom. Boston Ranch Co. v. Department of the Interior, 111 S. Ct. 555 
(1990)(per Fletcher, J.; other panel members were Ferguson, J.; and Fernandez, J., dis-
senting). Barcellos & Wolfsen was decided by the Ninth Circuit two days after Peterson 
v. Department of the Interior. Plaintiffs were Boston Ranch Company, Edwin J. O'Neill 
and West Haven Farming Company, all owners of more than 1000 acres of land receiving 
federal water. Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d at 815. 
In Barcellos & Wolfsen, landowners had signed recordable contracts before 1976, 
pursuant to the Federal Reclamation Act. Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d at 817. They 
sued the Water District, requesting that the $8.00 price in their contracts be enforced. 
Id. Between 1976 and 1982, when the RRA was passed, landowners could not sell lands 
according to their contracts, but during that time some did continue to receive subsi-
dized water for both 160-acre plots and excess lands. Id. In 1984 the recordable contracts 
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to the RRA.272 The amendment enforced the application to re-
cordable contracts of section 205(c)2'7S and of the revised Rule.274 
The landowners argued that the amendment did not apply to 
them, or that if it did, it retroactively impaired the contract be-
tween the federal government and the Water District, of which 
they were third party beneficiaries.:m The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's dismissal of the claim, holding that 
the landowners' due process and separation of powers claims 
could not be sustained.276 The court found that while contract 
rights derived from government contracts may be property 
rights for the purpose of a due process claim,277 the Barcellos 
and Wolfsen plaintiffs had not fulfilled the conditions imposed 
on them by the contract, and thus no rights had vested.278 Fur-
ther, the right to a remedy of the landowners' choosing, specific 
performance, was not a constitutionally protectable right.279 
were amended to provide extra time for disposal of excess lands, but nothing was in-
cluded in the contracts to reflect the current Department of Interior rule that water 
prices would remain at the contract rate during the extended period. [d. at 819. The 
landowners claimed they should receive subsidized water for the entire duration of the 
extra time they were allowed to sell their excess lands. Id. at 817. 
See also Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 491 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. 
Cal. 1980); National Land for People, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 417 F. Supp. 449 
(1970) (granting injunction against sale of excess lands under recordable contracts until 
new regulations promulgated). 
272. Section 224(e); 43 U.S.C. § 390ww(h) (1989) specifically made section 205(c) 
applicable to all recordable contracts executed before 1982. 
273. 43 U.S.C. § 390ee(c) (1989). The section provides: 
Notwithstanding any extension of time of any recordable con-
tract ... lands under recordable contract shall be eligible to 
receive irrigation water at less than full cost for a period not to 
exceed ten years from the date such recordable contract was 
executed by the Secretary in the case of contracts existing 
prior to the date of enactment of this Act . . .. 
274. 43 C.F.R. § 426.11(i)(4)(ii), providing that "[f)or land under extended record-
able contract owned by prior law recipients, water deliveries shall be made at the full-
cost rate ... commencing December 23, 1987, through the effective termination date of 
the extended recordable contract." The law clarified that water prices would be at full 
price from then on. If the new law and rule were followed, they would supersede the 1986 
district court's stipulated judgment. Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d at 819. The landown-
ers sued to have the judgment enforced. Id. at 815. 
275. Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d at 820. 
276. Id. at 825, 826. The Ninth Circuit held that the stipulated judgment in favor of 
plaintiffs did not enter vested rights. Id. at 826. The dissent disagreed. Id. at 830-33. 
277. [d. at 821 (citing Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934». 
278. Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d at 822. The court stated further that the right to 
own excess land for more than 10 years under the contracts was in no way linked to an 
entitlement to receive subsidized water for more than 10 years. [d. at 824. 
279. Id. at 823. 
44
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss1/12
1991] WATER RIGHTS LAW 219 
In Israel v. Morton280 the plaintiff purchased both excess 
and non-excess lands which received reclamation water from the 
Grand Coulee Dam in Washington State.281 He wished to sell his 
excess land282 at market price, with an assurance that the land 
would be eligible to receive reclamation water.283 In 1962 the en-
abling legislation for the dam was amended, providing that the 
Columbia Basin Project was thenceforth to be governed by fed-
eral Reclamation Law.284 The Water District that delivered 
water to Israel's land entered into an amended repayment con-
tract with the government, incorporating the change in the stat-
ute. The plaintiffs alleged a deprivation of property without due 
process, asserting that after the five years stipulated in 'the 1945 
contract had passed, they had become vested with an un-
restricted right to sell their excess lands, including the entitle-
ment to water. 
The court found that reclamation water was not "natural 
flow" water, appurtenant to the land and subject to state law; 
but that it was instead "project water," appropriated to the 
United States and not appurtenant to the land, and that it was 
not there for the taking by the landowner, but "for the giving by" 
the United States."2811 The court found that if rights to receive 
and use water were to vest "beyond the power of the United 
States to take without compensation," that such vesting could 
only occur on terms fixed by the government.286 The court also 
noted language in the contracts that subjected the rights it con-
veyed to "'any acts amendatory thereof or supplementary 
thereto.' "287 A restriction on the right to sell excess lands at a 
price above the value set by the Secretary of the Interior was 
held not to be a taking without due process, because there is no 
vested right to a continuation of status conferred by the original 
280. 549 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1977). 
281. Israel u. Morton, 459 F.2d at 130-31. 
282. Id. The excess land had not received reclamation water while Israel owned it. 
Israel v. Morton, 549 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1977). 
283. Id. at 131. The appraised value of the land at the time of the suit was $6,900. 
Id. The market value, taking into account its potential to receive reclamation water, was 
$24,000. Id. 
284. Israel, 549 F.2d at 131. 43 U.S.C. § 423e provided that all owners of land in 
excess of 160 acres must sign recordable contracts and divest within 10 years from the 
signing of the contract. 
285. Israel, 549 F.2d at 132. 
286. Id. at 133. 
287. Id. 
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government contract.288 
In United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir CO.289 Nevada 
Indian tribes sought to have court-approved transfers of state-
law water rights invalidated.290 The government had sought to 
transfer water rights that had been held but not used from gov-
ernment lands to irrigated lands that were receiving water under 
federal or state Reclamation projects.291 The tribes contended 
that the proposed transfers violated Nevada law governing aban-
donment of water rights, and that section 8 of the Reclamation 
Act should apply.292 The federal government contended that the 
1913 Nevada law did not apply retroactively to affect rights that 
had vested in the United States in 1902.293 The Ninth Circuit 
held,29. following California v. United States,29& that Nevada 
state law governed, by application of the 1902 law itself,296 al-
though under Nevada law the tribes had already abandoned 
their rights because they had not been used.297 
288. [d. Compare Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d at 824, indicating that ownership 
of excess land under recordable contracts is not linked to entitlement to subsidized 
water. 
289. 878 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1989). The litigation leading up to Alpine Land began 
in 1913 and encompassed the Supreme Court's decision in Nevada v. United States, 463 
U.S. 110 (1983). Alpine Land, 878 F.2d at 1219. The most recent case is United States v. 
Orr Ditch Co., 914 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1990) (Nevada state law applies to cities' proposal 
to divert sewage effluent from Truckee River to land irrigation). 
290. Alpine Land, 878 F.2d at 1219. 
291. [d. at 1221. 
292. [d. 
293. [d. at 1222. The United States contended that when lands were withdrawn 
from the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation in 1903 to form the Truckee-Carsen Irriga-
tion District, the water rights vested in the federal government, and that even though 
there had been non-use of the water after 1913, there was no intent by the government 
to abandon. [d. 'at 1220, 1222. 
294. Alpine Land, 878 F.2d at 1223. 
295. 438 U.S. 645, 664 (1978). 
296. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1989). 
297. Alpine Land, 878 F.2d at 1226. Judge Hall observed (quoting Nevada v. United 
States, 463 U.S. 110, 126 (1983)): "The law of Nevada, in common with most other West-
ern States, requires for the perfection of a water right for agricultural purposes that the 
water must be beneficially used by actual application on the land." The court in Alpine 
quoted a previous Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 
697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983), to note that Nevada law 
governed only so long as it was not inconsistent with the section 8 requirement of benefi-
cial use. Alpine Land, 878 F.2d at 1228 (quoting California v. United States, 438 U.S. 
645,668 n.21 (1978)). See CAL. WATER CODE § 1201(b) (West 1971) (water appropriated 
before 1914 that has not been put to its appropriative purpose or to some useful or 
beneficial purpose becomes unappropriated water). 
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In United States v. Quincy-Columbia Basin Irrigation Dis-
trict,298 a water district challenged Bureau of Reclamation regu-
lations,299 promulgated pursuant to the Reclamation Reform 
Act,300 that required landowners to report the amount of acreage 
they controlled to the water district, which then reports to the 
Secretary of the Interior.301 The district court found that en-
forcement of the new regulation was not inconsistent with the 
general policy underlying the original Reclamation Act, that the 
Reclamation Reform Act was not a change of the original Act 
but a supplement to it,302 and that the Water District could, if 
necessary, cease to supply water to non-complying 
landowners.303 
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit held that the Water Districts' contract 
rights were not vested property rights protected under the fifth 
amendment, and it was not necessary to undertake a taking or 
due process analysis.304 The court said that in a fifth amendment 
challenge to a government action, the first step is to determine 
whether there is a protectable right.306 
In determining whether the Districts' rights under the con-
tracts included "a constitutionally protected property interest in 
the delivery of subsidized water to leased tracts of any size,"306 
the Ninth Circuit followed two lines of inquiry. First, the court 
examined the sovereign power of Congress to amend legislation 
so as to affect rights under contracts executed under the prior 
legislation.307 Second, the court examined the extent to which 
298. 649 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Wash. 1986). 
299. 43 C.F.R. §§ 426.1-.24 (1983). 
300. 43 U.S.C. § 390ww(c); 43 U.S.C. § 390zz. 
301. Quincy-Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist., 649 F. Supp. at 489. The landowners 
were exempt from statutory reporting requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 390ff. [d. 
302. Id. at 492. 
303. Id. 
304. Peterson v. Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 813 (1990). 
305. [d. at 807 (citing Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 
477 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1986) and FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84,91 (1958». The Ninth 
Circuit noted that in this case there was no Contract Clause issue raised since the statute 
involved is a federal rather than a state law. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 807 n.15 (citing Pen-
sion Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 732 n.9 (1984)). 
306. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 807. 
307. [d. 
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the Water Districts' rights under the contracts could equal inde-
feasible property rights.308 
A. SOVEREIGN POWER 
1. Sovereign Power and Duty to Enter and to Honor Contracts 
The court first noted that as sovereign the federal govern-
ment has the power to enter contracts, and a concomitant duty 
to honor its contracts.309 In the opinion, the court applied three 
principles to interpret the federal government's contractual 
agreements: 1) the federal government's sovereign power to 
change its contracts legislatively remains intact unless it is sur-
rendered in unmistakable terms;310 2) if possible, government 
contracts should be construed to avoid foreclosing the exercise 
of sovereign authority;311 and 3) government contracts should be 
interpreted against the backdrop of the legislative scheme that 
authorized them, and interpretation of ambiguous terms or im-
plied covenants can be made only in light of the policies under-
lying the controlling legislation.312 
2. Sovereign Power To Amend Legislation Affecting Govern-
ment Contracts 
The court noted that where, as in the Sinking Fund line of 
cases,313 legislation has altered or repudiated the provisions of a 
government contract, language that expressly reserves to Con-
gress the right to amend the act at any time is dispositive of the 
question.314 
The court stated, however, that the Legislature has a right 
to amend legislation even where the original legislation contains 
no express provision for subsequent amendment.3111 The sover-
308. [d. 
309. [d. (citing Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 52). 
310. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 807 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 
130, 148 (1982). 
311. [d. (citing Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 52-53). 
312. [d. (citing Darlington, 358 U.S. at 87-88). 
313. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878). See also Lynch, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); 
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 170 U.S. 451 (1985). 
314. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 808. 
315. [d. The plaintiffs had contended that where there is no express provision in 
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eign power to amend subsequent legislation affecting its own 
contractual arrangements "endures, albeit with some 
limitations. "316 
The Ninth Circuit noted that Congress always has the 
power to amend, repeal or ignore legislation passed by earlier 
Congresses.317 The court suggested that in Public Agencies318 the 
Supreme Court had confirmed this with a statement that "Con-
gress must surrender its sovereign power 'in unmistakable terms' 
before a court may find that Congress has yielded such 
power .... "319 
B. VESTED RIGHTS 
1. Language of Contracts 
Since the Reclamation Act did not contain an express provi-
sion for later amendments, the court examined the Water Dis-
tricts' contracts to determine whether, as the Districts con-
tended, Congress had expressly surrendered its right to impose 
limitations on the size of leased tracts that could receive recla-
mation water, giving rise to a vested right in the Districts.320 The 
court rejected this claim, analogizing to Darlington.321 The 
Ninth Circuit looked instead to the purpose of the legislation, 
finding that, as in Darlington, the interpretation the plaintiffs 
wanted to give the language was contrary to Congressional 
intent.322 
legislation for amendment, Congress' right to amend is limited. Id. at 807. 
316. [d. at 808 (citing Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 
477 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986». The court in Peterson noted, "the exercise of the 'reserved 
power' is not absolute .... Congress could not rely on that power to 'take away property 
already acquired under the operation of the charter, or to deprive the corporation of the 
fruits actually reduced to possession of contracts lawfully made." Peterson, 899 F.2d at 
808 n.16 (citing Public Agencies, 477 U.S. 41, 55 quoting Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 
700, 720 (1878». 
317. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 808 (citing Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905»; 
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 816 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1987); and Community Servo Broadcast-
ing of Mid-America, Inc. V. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1113 (D.C. Cir 1978». 
318. 477 U.S. 41. 
319. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 808 (citing Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 52). 
320. [d. at 809. 
321. [d. at 810 (citing FHA V. The Darlington Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958». 
322. Id. The court cited California V. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); City of 
Fresno V. California, 372 U.S. 672 (1963); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. V. McCracken, 357 
U.S. 275 (1958); United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1976); 
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The court held that since the reclamation projects were 
funded by the federal government with the express purpose of 
using the subsidized water to promote the development of fam-
ily-owned farms with the "end" of dismantling large landhold-
ings in the West and the redistribution of that land to families, 
any other interpretation would seriously impair Congress' sover-
eign power to pass laws for the public welfare.323 The court said 
that it did not believe that Congress must exhaustively proscribe 
conduct in a regulated field to prevent parties from claiming an 
"implied vested right" to engage in conduct that was found by 
later Congresses to be harmful to the public welfare.324 
The court also cited Public Agencies, noting that in that 
case a statutory amendment to the enabling legislation did not 
amount to a repudiation by the government of its contractual 
obligations.m In Public Agencies, as in Darlington, the new pro-
vision was simply a part of a regulatory program over which 
Congress retained its authority to amend in the exercise of its 
power to provide for the general welfare.326 
The court further held that the language of the contract did 
not contain an express waiver of Congressional power to amend 
the law in a way that would interfere with that right, reiterating, 
"[t]he contracts'contain no language that can be construed as a 
'surrender in unmistakable terms' of the sovereign's ability to 
regulate the quantity of subsidized water that may be provided 
to leased farm lands."327 The court applied the Public Agencies 
and National Land for People, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 417 F. Supp. 449 (D.D.C. 
1976) to illustrate the history and purpose of the Reclamation Act of 1902 and of the 
Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. The court made extensive references to legislative his-
tory to show both the facts underlying the Reclamation Reform Act and the policy that 
informed the Act. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 802-06. The Ninth Circuit suggested, "[t]he im-
plied right asserted here clearly violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the reclamation 
laws which authorized such contracts." [d. 
323. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 811. This was regardless of the Department of the Inte-
rior's contrary actions. [d. 
324: [d. . 
325. [d. 
326. [d. (quoting from Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrap-
ment, 477 U.S. 41, 55 (1986». The court in Peterson noted, "[i]f anything, California had 
a greater claim to a vested right in Public Agencies than do the Water Districts in this 
case because in Public Agencies the federal government had incorporated in an agree-
ment with the states an express promise that they could withdraw from the social secur-
ity system." Peterson, 899 F.2d at 811. 
327. [d. at 812. The court looked to Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 52, for the lan-
50
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss1/12
1991] WATER RIGHTS LAW 225 
principle of construing government contracts to avoid foreclos-
ing the exercise of sovereign authority whenever possible.328 A 
reasonable interpretation of the contract language was that the 
Districts were merely given a choice between renegotiating their 
contracts so as to conform with the new law or withdrawing from' 
the reclamation program altogether.328 The Districts did not re-
ceive the right to receive water under pre-existing contracts that 
violated new amendments to the statute.330 The Districts only 
option for receiving subsidized water was to conform to the new 
law.331 The court further noted that this interpretation was rea-
sonable in light both of the Public Agencies principle and of the 
contract language itself, which provided that where there was 
Congressional amendment of reclamation law, the Water Dis-
tricts' actions must be "consistent with the provision of such re-
peal or amendment. "332 
2. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations 
The court briefly addressed the Water Distficts' claims of 
"reasonable investment backed expectations. "333 The Districts 
claims had relied33' on these expectations in making the con-
tracts and contended that the expectations would amount to a 
property interest protected by the fifth amendment.33Ci The 
court distinguished Ruckelshaus u. Monsanto CO.,336 noting that 
the Ruckelshaus proposition that a reasonable investment-
backed expectation is "one of several" factors taken into account 
in a taking inquiry is relevant only where the court has already 
guage concerning a surrender in unmistakable terms. See also Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
328. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 812 (citing Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 53). 




333. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 813. 
334. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 812. The court suggested that the "argument takes on the 
flavor of an equitable estoppel claim against the government." [d. at 813 n.18. 
335. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 812. The water districts had argued that their expecta-
tion of subsidized water was reasonable based on the law that was in effect at the time 
the contracts were made. [d. at 813 (citing Appellants' Opening Brief at 36). The Dis-
tricts claimed that the new statute destroyed their expectations. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 
813. 
336. 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1986). 
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found a vested right subject to fifth amendment protection.337 In 
Peterson, there was no protectable vested right, and certainly 
not one created by the plaintiffs' investment backed 
expectations.338 
3. Due Process 
The Ninth Circuit found that since there was no vested 
property right in the Water Districts, there could be no due pro-
cess claim under the Takings Clause of the fifth amendment.339 
In the absence of a vested property right, due process would ap-
ply only if the Districts could show that the Hammer Clause was 
"arbitrary and irrational."34o The court upheld the district 
court's decision that the Hammer Clause was rationally related 
to a legitimate governmental purpose,341 and said therefore, the 
clause was not arbitrary or irrational.s42 The court relied on the 
provisions of the Act, together with its legislative history, to con-
clude that Congress's primary concerns were not with the federal 
budget,34S but with the promotion of family farming. SH 
V. CRITIQUE 
A. ISSUES DECIDED BY NINTH CIRCUIT 
1. Sovereign Right to Amend 
The cases relied on by the Ninth Circuit in de<;iding Peter-
son indicate that the federal government, as sovereign, may pass 
statutes that retroactively change the rights of non-federal par-
ties to contracts, even if the contract is with the government.3411 
337. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 813. 
338. [d. 
339. [d. 
340. [d. (citing Gray, 467 U.S. at 729). 
341. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 813 (citing 128 CONGo REC. 8809 (1982)(statement of Rep. 
Clausen); H.R. REP. No. 458, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1982)(statement of Rep. Miller)). 
342. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 813. 
343. [d. at 813 n.20 (citing Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 55). The Court emphasized· 
that "[t]he Due Process Clause prevents Congress from 'repudiat[ing] its own debts ... 
simply in order to save money" and also from modifying an existing contract to which 
the United States is a party if the legislation deprives the other party of contract bene-
fits 'actually reduced to possession." ld. 
344. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 813 n.19. 
345. Peterson v. Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1990). Cases 
cited by the Ninth Circuit in support of the sovereign right to amend contracts included 
Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986); Na-
tional R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 470 U.S. 541 (1985); Pension 
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In Peterson the Water Districts entered into water delivery con-
tracts with the Bureau of Reclamation with ample notice that 
the terms of the contract might be changed by Congress.346 The 
Water Districts and their individual members had reason to 
know that their contracts with the' Bureau of Reclamation were 
subject to change, even if there were no express provision in the 
statute or in the contracts for amendment at the option of the 
government.347 
2. Contract Rights 
Bowen u. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security En-
trapment348 and FHA u. The Darlington, Inc. 349 were the opin-
ions cited most extensively by the Ninth Circuit in support of a 
finding that the Water Districts' contract rights were not consti-
tutionally protected property rights.360 In these, as in other Su-
preme Court decisions governing retroactive impairment of con-
tracts by the federal government,361 the contracts did not confer 
vested rights partly because the non-federal parties were consid-
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958); Perry v. 
United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350-51 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 576-77 
(1934); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 487 (1905); Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 
730 (1878); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 816 F.2d 205, 215 (5th Cir. 1987); Community Servo 
Broadcasting of Mid-America, Inc. V. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
Some of the same cases were cited for the same proposition in Barcellos & Wolfsen, 
Inc. v. Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1990). See National R.R. Pas-
senger Corp. V. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 470 U.S. 451 (1985); Lynch v. United States, 292 
U.S. 571, 579 (1934). In Barcellos & Wolfsen the panel also cited Horowitz v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925). 
346. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 
(1986); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). The case law supporting 
this principle is consistent and significantly predates the Water Districts' contracts. See 
FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 
576-77 (1934); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 487 (1905); Sinking Fund Cases, 99 
U.S. 700 (1878). 
347. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 808. 
348. 477 U.S. 41 (1986). 
349. 358 U.S. 84 (1958). 
350. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 813. 
351. E.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. 1570 (1990); 
Western Fuels-Utah v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Education Assistance Corp. 
v. Cavazos, 902 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1990); Ohio Student Loan Comm'n v. Cavazos, 900 
F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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ered to have adequate notice that the government could 
amend. 3112 
In pursuing an analogy between Peterson and Darlington 
the Ninth Circuit implied that a further reason for not consider-
ing the Districts' contract rights to be vested was that the con-
tracts were entered into under a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme.3113 In a number of decisions on retroactivity, the Su-
preme Court has noted that when a nonfederal party has en-
tered into the contract in order to receive the benefits of pursu-
ing the activity regulated, it is therefore expected to assume the 
burdens as well.3114 In Peterson the Water Districts and their 
members were participating in the Central Valley Project in or-
der to receive low-cost irrigation water. 3l1li As in Darlington,31S6 
the Water Districts had also been benefiting from administrative 
failure to enforce some aspects of the program.31S7 However, in 
neither Darlington nor Peterson did such previous non-enforce-
ment bestow an implied vested right to continue to engage in 
conduct that was later found by Congress to be harmful to the 
public welfare.3118 
3. Judicial Interpretation 
Reliance on Public Agencies31S9 and Dariington360 permitted 
the Ninth Circuit to adhere to principles of construction that 
required it to avoid constitutional issues.361 The court also 
352. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 808, 811. 
353. [d. at 807, 811. 
354. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 (1985); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. 
R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); 
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. 
Westland Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1990) (RRA created a new regime of 
benefits and burdens for excess landowners). 
355. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 810. 
356. FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958). 
357. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 811. 
358. Id. 
359. 477 U.S. 41 (1986). 
360. 358 U.S. 84 (1958). 
361. See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westland Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 821 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974». In Barcellos & Wolfsen land-
owners, suing the Water District, suggested that a court, given two possible interpreta-
tions of a statute should "stretch" to find the construction that does not raise a "serious" 
constitutional question. [d. The court noted that while this was true, there was no need 
for the court to "play the role of contortionist" to avoid constitutional issues. [d. How-
ever, since the court did not find a constitutionally protected right in Barcellos & Wolf-
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avoided an interpretation of any possible ambiguities that would 
limit the exercise of sovereign authority.362 The decision was 
made in light of the legislative purpose363 that informed both the 
Reclamation Act of 1902364 and the Reclamation Reform Act,3811 
rather than merely relying on the plain language of the statute 
or the contracts.366 
4. Policy 
In Peterson the court analyzed the Districts' water delivery 
contracts in light of legislative intent.367 The court relied on 
Darlington368 to hold that a literal interpretation of the con-
tracts could result in an outcome that directly violated Congres-
sional purpose.369 This approach was consistent with that ap-
plied in the Reclamation Act decisions on which the court relied 
to illustrate Congressional purpose with respect to the Reclama-
tion Acts,370 as well as with the approach of the retroactivity 
cases preferred by the Ninth Circuit.371 
sen, no constitutional issue arose in any case. [d. 
362. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 812 (citing Bowen v. Public Agencies Against Social Sec. 
Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52-53 (1986)). 
363. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 807 (citing FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 87-
88 (1958)). The court in Barcellos & Wolfsen also grounded the opinion in legislative 
intent, although in Barcellos & Wolfsen the language would have been enough. Barcellos 
& Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1990). 
364. 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-616 (1989). 
365. 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa-390zz-1 (1989). 
366. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 810. The Districts' contracts expressly provided that the 
contracts could be amended at the option of the Water Districts, if legislation were al-
tered. [d. at 809, 812. The Ninth Circuit interpreted this provision as giving the Districts 
the choice of amending to conform with new laws or staying with the provisions of the 
old law. [d. at 812. It also seems possible to draw the inference from the express contract 
provision in favor of the Districts, however, that the government's right to amend the 
contracts to conform to new legislation was implicit, whereas that of the Districts was 
not. If that were so, there would have been no need to include an express provision 
permitting contract amendment by the government. 
367. [d. at 802-07. 
368. 358 U.S. 84 (1958). 
369. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 810. 
370. E.g., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. 
McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1095 
(9th Cir. 1976). 
371. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 
(1986); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 470 U.S. 541 (1985); 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984); FHA v. The Dar-
lington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958). 
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B. ISSUES NOT EXAMINED BY NINTH CIRCUIT 
1. Standing 
Under the Ninth Circuit's test for standing in Reclamation 
Act cases,372 the Districts had not met the first or last prongs of 
the three-part standing test.373 First, the Districts had not suf-
fered an injury in fact by the government's actions.374 The right 
asserted by the Water Districts was a statutory and contractual 
right to receive water from the federal government and pass it 
on to landowners.37& To meet the actual injury prong of the 
standing test, the Districts would have had to show the ways in 
which deprivation of this right injured them.376 
It is not easy to see how implementation of the RRA, which 
provides that the districts must change their contracts with their 
customers or charge them full price, would constitute an injury 
to the Water Districts, when their statutory function is to facili-
tate implementation of the law.377 If the federal government 
were simply going to charge the Water Districts more, the Dis-
tricts could presumably pass the extra costs on to individual 
landowners. 
The remedy sought also did not meet the third prong of the 
standing test, redressability.S78 The remedy sought by the Water 
Districts was a declaration that the "Hammer Clause" was un-
constitutional.S79 Under the facts of Peterson, a declaration that 
372. United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977); Bowker 
v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1976). 
373. Bowker, 531 F.2d at 1349. 
374. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509; Bowker, 531 F.2d 1347. 
375. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 801. 
376. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509; Bowker, 531 F.2d 1347. 
377. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 804. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 423e (1989); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 
11102; 20500-26875; 34150-37214 (West 1984 &: Supp. 1991). 
378. Bowker, 531 F.2d at 1349. 
379. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 801. In Barcellos & Wolfsen the court observed that the 
remedy sought by landowners against Westlands Water District was specific performance 
on "a contract that they argue[d) entitle[d) them to subsidized water for as long as they 
own their lands," rather than compensatory damages. Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d 814, 
823 (9th Cir. 1990). Even when there has been a taking of vested rights, the Supreme 
Court favors compensation as a remedy. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 
1016-17 (1984); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 671 (1978); Dugan v. Rank, 372 
U.S. 609 (1963); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 290 (1958); United 
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the RRA was' unconstitutional could have put the Districts in a 
worse position than they would enjoy if it were allowed to stand. 
The Bureau of Reclamation might then have enforced the more 
stringent acreage or repayment requirements of the original Rec-
lamation Act.880 
Although the Districts might not have had standing on their 
own, they might have had it as representatives of the landown-
ers. The theories under which such representation could have 
conferred standing are: 1) the Water Districts were essentially a 
trade association;881 2) the State was suing the federal govern-
ment in parens patriae,882 or 3) the Districts were suing on be-
half of third party beneficiaries of the contracts.888 The Districts 
are more likely to be a traditional government agency than a 
trade association, since they are established by state law to re-
distribute irrigation water.88. The in parens patriae right is as-
serted by the state itself, not by state agencies like the Water 
Districts.3811 Of the three, the third-party beneficiary approach 
was expressly recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Barcellos & 
Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water District. 886 In Peterson such 
right was also acknowledged, at least implicitly.387 The Districts 
were apparently the intended beneficiaries of the contracts.388 
States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950). Thus, although the landowners 
might have been able to allege breach of contract, such a breach could not have been 
redressed by the remedy the landowners requested. Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d at 
820. 
380. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 814. The Ninth Circuit noted that any water district that 
wanted to retain the lower contract price and the 160-acre ownership limit, rather than 
amending its contracts, was free to do so. Id. 
381. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 344 
(1977); Washington State Dairy Prod. Comm'n v. United States, 685 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
382. United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 535 (1973); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 
U.S. 589, 615 (1945). 
383. Karo v. San Diego Symphony Orchestra Ass'n, 762 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1985). 
384. Washington State Dairy Prod. Comm'n v. United States, 685 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
385. United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 535 (1973); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 
U.S. 589, 615 (1945). 
386. 899 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 1990). 
387. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 801 n.1. The court stated that landowners did not have 
any rights in reclamation water that was not dependent on the Water Districts' contrac-
tual right to the water. Id. However, it also seems possible that the Water Districts may 
not have any right to the water that is not dependent on the landowners' third-party 
rights. 
388. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 801 n.1. See Karo, 762 F.2d 819. 
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2. Property Rights 
Ruckeshaus v. Monsanto CO.,389 Lynch v. United States390 
and the Sinking Fund Cases391 emphasized that the sovereign 
right to amend stops short when a vested property right is 
touched by a retroactive statute.392 In Peterson the Ninth Cir-
cuit acknowledged this limit in citing a passage from Bowen v. 
Public Agencies Against Social Security Entrapment393 that 
listed the kinds of contract rights that could be considered 
vested under a retroactive statute.394 
In Peterson, the court decided that because the Districts' 
contract rights arose under circumstances that clearly permitted 
the sovereign to amend,S911 the contracts could not have con-
ferred vested rights.s96 As in Peterson, the Barcellos & Wolfsen 
panel used only retroactivity cases397 to determine whether the 
plaintiffs had a protectable right. The analysis could be re-
versed. The Ninth Circuit could have looked at the nature of the 
rights first to see whether under other state or federal criteria 
any rights had vested, and then could have determined whether 
389. 467 u.s. 986 (1984). 
390. 292 u.S. 571 (1934). 
391. 99 u.s. 700 (1878). 
392. Lynch, 292 U.S. at 577; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. at 718-19. 
393. 477 U.S. 41 (1986). 
394. Peterson v. Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 811 (9th Cir. 1990) (quot-
ing Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 55). The passage from Public Agencies listed debts of 
the United States (probably a reference to Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350-51 
(1935)), obligations of the United States for which the obligee had paid a monetary pre-
mium (probably a reference to Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934)), and provi-
sions specific to the particular contract, for which the non-federal party had bargained 
and had given consideration, as rights that could be constitutionally protected. Peterson, 
899 F.2d at 811 (quoting Public Agencies, 477 U.S. at 55). 
395. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 811. The right to amend had not been surrendered in 
unmistakable terms. [d. at 812. The statute amended was a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme, in which nonfederal parties could expect Congressional amendment. [d. at 810-
11. 
396. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 813. A similar analysis was used for the due process chal-
lenge in Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1990). 
The Ninth Circuit cited National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 470 
U.S. 451 (1985) to illustrate the principle that the first step in a due process analysis of a 
contract right is to show that a contract right exists. Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d at 
821. The second step is to show substantial impairment of the right. [d. As in Peterson, 
the court found in Barcellos & Wolfsen that since no constitutionally protected right 
existed, there was no need to pass on to the second step of the inquiry. [d. 
397. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 470 U.S. 451 (1985); 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 732-33 (1984); Lynch v. 
United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934); Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.SA. 458 (1925). 
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any vested rights had been reached by the retroactive statute. 
In Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water District398 
the court, citing Lynch399 implied that the rights of landowners 
against Water Districts could equal property rights, at least for 
due process purposes,400 if not for taking purposes.401 This con-
clusion leaves open the question as to whether, under retroactiv-
ity cases, there are any circumstances in which a contract right 
to receive reclamation water could be a vested right. 
3. Water Rights 
In Peterson the extensive body of reclamation law was used 
only to illustrate Reclamation Act history and legislative poli-
cies.402 The assumption the Ninth Circuit seemed to have made 
in Peterson, as did the Supreme Court in Ivanhoe Irrigation 
District v. McCracken/03 was that water, once appropriated to 
the federal government, becomes its property and is subject to 
federal control. 404 The issue of whether federal or California law 
determines the nature of rights to receive subsidized irrigation 
water might require a different analysis frorn that in Peterson, 
however, if the Ninth Circuit took into account two more recent 
Supreme Court decisions on the Central Valley, California v. 
398. 899 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1990). 
399. 292 u.S. 571, 579 (1934) (rights against the United States arising out of a con-
tract with it are property rights). 
400. Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d at 821. It was the Barcellos & Wolfsen plaintiffs' 
failure to fulfill contract conditions, including timely repayment of capital costs that 
caused their due process claim to fail. [d. The difference between this conclusion and 
that of the panel in Peterson may simply be a reflection of the different facts in Barcel-
los & Wolfsen. For example, the contracts involved are to be interpreted under state, 
rather than federal law. Roos-Collins, supra note 21 at 848. The challenged law is an 
amendment to the RRA that was passed after a stipulated judgment in favor of the 
landowners was handed down. Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 
F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1990). In Peterson there had been no prior judgment. 
401. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75 (1982). 
402. Peterson v. Depai'tment of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 802-06 (9th Cir. 1990). 
See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); City of Fresno v. California, 372 
U.S. 672 (1963); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); United 
States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1976); National Land for Peo-
ple, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 417 F. Supp. 449 (D. D.C. 1976). 
403. 357 U.S. 275 (1958). 
404. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 803 ("Congress prohibited the sale of project water" to 
non-resident landowners) (emphasis added). 
59
Robertson: Water Rights Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991
234 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:175 
United States'Of> and Bryant v. Yellen"06 and applied section 8 
of the Reclamation Act.407 
If the Ninth Circuit were to interpret the Peterson facts 
under California v. United States"08 the court might find that 
the ultimate disposition of irrigation water was a matter to be 
determined according to state law under section 8 of the Recla-
mation Act.'09 If, as in Bryant v. Yellen,'10 any state law water 
rights had vested in the Water Districts, or in their member 
landowners, there could then have been a valid fifth amendment 
claim."n 
Under California v. United States"m the State of California 
would have an interest in the allocation of irrigation water that 
would supersede that of either the federal government or of in-
dividual irrigators because of the precisions of section 8 of the 
Reclamation ActYs However, the Ninth Circuit might be 
presented with a choice between California v. United States and 
the most recent Supreme Court declaration on section 8 lan-
guage, California v. Federal Energy Regulation Commission."14 
Although California v. United States was distinguished in 
FERC, the latter case would be more consistent with the ap-
proach under Peterson. 
4. Fifth Amendment Considerations 
If there were any vested property rights involved in Peter-
son, whether by contract or by state water law, the rights would 
need to be analyzed in terms of the Taking"1!! and Due Process 
Clauses of the fifth amendment. 
405. 438 U.S. 645 (1978). 
406. 447 U.S. 352 (1980). 
407. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1989). 
408. 438 U.S. 645 (1978). 
409. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1989). 
410. 447 U.S. 352 (1980). 
411. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. at 372·73. 
412. 438 U.S. 645. 
413. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1989). 
414. 110 S. Ct. 2024 (1990). 
415. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Since the Taking Clause is limited to "private property," 
it is unclear on what basis the Districts would raise a taking claim. 
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Although the Ninth Circuit did not undertake a taking or 
due process analysis, the panel indicated the way these issues 
might be decided if a vested right were to be be found. If the 
right to receive water were found to be a state-law-defined right, 
a taking question would then be raised. However, to establish a 
taking, the rights would need to be well-established as the ripa-
rian owners' rights were in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock. 
CO.416 The Ninth Circuit noted that under Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo CO.,417 once a vested right in an incorporeal property418 is 
found, a "reasonable investment-backed expectation" is only one 
of several factors to be taken into account in a taking analysis.419 
In Monsanto, another of these factors was the nature of the gov-
ernmental action.420 When the area in which the amendment 
was made was known to be a subject of public concern and gov-
ernment regulation421 and when the party claiming the right was 
aware of conditions attaching to its property,m there was still 
no taking.423 It could be said of the Water Districts and their 
customers that they too were operating in an area of public con-
cern and extensive regulation424 and were aware of the condi-
tions attaching to their participation.42tI The Ninth Circuit has 
expressed in Peterson the conviction that the Water Districts' 
expectations did not meet the standard of "distinct investment 
backed expectations." As in Monsanto, the government action 
was a statute amending a comprehensive regulatory scheme. It is 
also doubtful that the Districts or their members could have 
been shown to have suffered a significant economic loss, under 
416. 339 u.s. 725 (1950). 
417. 467 u.s. 986 (1984). 
418. The extent to which the right to receive federal water is viewed as a physical 
property would determine the Taking analysis that would apply, since a different stan-
dard is used for physical property. E.g. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 
U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); 
United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950). Compare Connolly v. Pen-
sion Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 
986 (1984). 
419. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 813. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 
1005 (1986). 
420. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at lO05. 
421. Id. at lO07. 
422. [d. 
423. Id. 
424. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 811. 
425. Id. (citing FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958) to emphasize the 
"ever present possibility" that Congress would amend the reclamation laws). 
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the third prong of the Monsanto test. 
The Ninth Circuit disposed of the Districts' due process 
claim on the basis that only contract rights were involved, and 
applied the "arbitrary and irrational" standard.426 However, the 
court indicated that even if property rights were claimed, they 
would have to be "practical, substantial rights"427 to sustain a 
due process claim.'26 If the Districts' rights were shown to be 
property rights under section 8429 of the Reclamation Act, due 
process would require a similar rational relationship standard. 
5. Policy 
The Peterson decision was founded on legislative intent.'so 
A question remains unanswered by the Ninth Circuit in Peter-
son, and in Barcellos & Wolfsen as well; this is whether the Rec-
lamation Act, even as revised by the RRA, addresses purposes 
that can be realized.4S1 It is not certain that in the Central Val-
ley a farm of 960 acres is significantly more sustainable than a 
farm of 160 acres. It may be that a more realistic purpose for 
subsidized water is production, as stated in the Bureau of Recla-
mation rules. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Peterson was economical and 
efficient. The court apparently did not wish to take the opportu-
nity to address the issues of state law control or ownership of 
water. The constitutional issue of taking was avoided. The opin-
ion is structured to preserve the status quo. The Ninth Circuit 
preserved adherence to the legislative purpose that had in-
426. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 813 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. RA. Gray & 
Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984)). 
427. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 813 (citing Darlington, 358 U.S. at 91). 
428. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 813. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court observed in 
Monsanto that a "reasonable investment-backed expectation" should be based on more 
than a unilateral expectation or need. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-
06 (1984). 
429. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1989). 
430. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 814. 
431. See 43 C.F.R. § 230.68 (1990): "The purpose ... is to secure the reclamation of 
arid or semiarid lands and to render them productive .... The final and only conclusive 
test of reclamation is production." 
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formed Reclamation Act decisions since 1937. While it was 
proper for the court to make the decision in Peterson as it did, 
the questions raised by a contrast between Peterson and Barcel· 
los & Wolfsen emphasize that Peterson is a fairly fact· specific 
decision. 
As has been noted, there is a recent increase in cases that 
have focused on questions of what constitutes a vested right, 
and the extent to which government may infringe on incorporeal 
rights. Peterson and Barcellos & Wolfsen offer two differing in· 
terpretations of the issue of vested rights, since the result of the 
cases is effectively the same, they do not offer a square conflict 
of holdings. We may expect further actions designed to force 
court decisions on two issues: what constitutes a vested right 
under a retroactive statute; and whether federal or state law de· 
termines what a property right in water is. 
Charlotte Robertson* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992 .. 
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